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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation: A strategic study of the top 20 liners during period
1980-2001
Degree:

M.Sc

Since Malcom McLean started his business with the converted vessel ‘’The Ideal
X’’, container shipping has been developed with double-digit average per annum
growth. Containerised cargo is moving around the world as the result of
globalisation, the lifting of trade barriers, the development of technology and so on.

Over the past 20 years, container shipping has been shown to be a high-risk business
with a continuos changing of the list of the top 20 container service operators. The
merging, acquisition and bankruptcy of some companies as well as the increase in
capacity of the others have been witnessed.

This dissertation will studies: the changing in the ranking, capacity development of
liners in the top 20 from 1980 to 2001; the factors and strategies that can lead to the
success and failure of liners during this period; and the trends in the liner industry for
the coming years.

This research shows the lists of ranking of liners from 1980 to 2001 based on the
capacity deployed and the findings from the study of the top 20. It then comes to
analyse a few selected liners, which the author thinks, outperformed others in
offering container-shipping services. The trends, development in container shipping
and the reactions of the top 20 liners to those trends are analysed in chapter 5. Finally,
the last chapter summarizes the findings of this study.

Key Words: Liner, Strategy, Ranking, Capacity, Profitability, Top 20.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Globalization is spreading all over the world, Mr. Ikuta, former senior managing
director of MOL, emphasizes that ’’International commerce is becoming increasingly
global as more people throughout the world expect a better standard of living and
availability of any merchandise they desire. Transportation is the key to serve that
purpose’’ (Damas,P. December 1991,cover story). Traders are becoming bigger and
they trade on the global scale wanting long-term, stable contracts with carriers on the
global scale.

In shipping, carriers are facing globalization in both supply and demand. The
customer is more demanding and wants the carrier to be big enough to serve their
business demands in the global perspective. As the consequence, carriers have to
expand their operations. We can see the picture of the capacity increase and the
carrier’s ambition by examining the top 20 liners through the period 1980 to 2001.

In 1980, the top 20 liners shared around 40% of the total world’s fleet capacity, it
was 43% in 1993, and 50% in 1997. In 2001, they controlled nearly 59% of the
world container fleet and 83% of the world cellular fleet. In fact, the top 20 liners
created a big barrier for the new comers entering the league.
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This research will try to discover and analyze data collected about those top 20 liners
from 1980 to 2001 with the aim to achieve the objectives below:
Ø To trace the development of their fleets
Ø To find and analyse the strategies that can lead to the success and failure
of liners
Ø To find and analyse what makes some liners outperform their rivals or
their changing strategies as they respond to the changes in liner shipping
Ø To analyse the trends in liner shipping and the reactions of the top 20
liners to those trends

1.2 Dissertation outline

Chapter 1:

In the introduction, the background and the purpose of the study are
stated

Chapter 2:

Containerisation and the main liner shipping strategies

Chapter 3:

The top 20 liners during period 1980- 2001 and some findings from
the study

Chapter 4:

Analysis of some selected liners: Maersk-Sealand, MOL, Evergreen
and MSC

Chapter 5:

Some trends and developments in liner shipping

Chapter 6:

The Conclusion

1.3 Research methodology:

All the collected data and reports were processed and analyzed in order to get the
best picture of the top 20 liners. The ways of collecting data were as follows:
ü Due to the fact that in container shipping carriers do not always inform and
publish their fleet capacity, management, marketing strategies and financial
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situation, therefore all the shipping research and consultant companies have
different data. Even one single consultancy may have different statistics. Some
reports (UNCTAD’s Annual Maritime Review, OECD report, etc) were used
statistics coming from several sources. Indeed, this creates conflicts where
making comparisons for long periods of time. Therefore, in my research I tried to
collect data from reliable sources as:
v Data for a liner’s capacity and their ranking:
Ø Containerization International (CI)
v Data for market report, all analyses:
Ø Lloyd’s List
Ø Lloyd’s Shipping Economist
Ø Fairplay
Ø American Shipper Magazine
Ø Containerization International Magazine.
Ø Drewry Shipping Consultant
Ø Clarkson Shipping Research
Ø Platou
Ø UNCTAD Maritime Reviews
Ø Carrier’s report and their websites
ü The statistics for the ranking and capacity of liners were based on the fleet
capacity deployed in services (nominal capacity) but sometimes were quite
approximate statistics due to:
Ø The carrier’s subsidiaries: whether or not to include their
subsidiaries or affiliates in their total capacity (for example: MSL
and Safmarine, Hanjin and Senator, Evergreen and Hatsu, Lloyd
Trestino,Uniglory)

3

Ø Ship particulars (True vessel’s capacity is controversial, the
carriers and ship-yards did not disclose exactly the carrying
capacity, like the case of Maersk- Sealand with its S- type vessel)
ü Recently, due to the request from carriers, some research and consultant
companies have revised their statistics. They have separated the capacity of the
carrier with its subsidiaries (like CI). However, the author has kept CI’s previous
rankings and statistics as the main source for this research, as those truly reflect
the carrier’s capacity.
ü The capacities were mainly figured as of a particular month of the year.
Therefore the reader could find some small discrepancies between this research
data and other publications as they used data figures at different times of the year.

Because of the difficulties in finding data, this research could not avoid errors. The
author would appreciate having the understanding and comments of the reader.
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CHAPTER 2
CONTAINERISATION AND THE MAIN LINER SHIPPING
STRATEGIES

Although containerization was started in 1965 by Malcom McLean with the converted
vessel ‘’ the Ideal X’’, it was during the period 1980-2001 that container shipping
developed rapidly and has been ‘’the engine driving our global economy, a key factor in
making today’s economic globalization possible’’(WSC 2001, p. 27)

Container shipping (liner shipping) is different from tramp shipping and is characterized
by many economic and political factors (WSC, 2001, p17) that we can be seen below:
v Operational features:
Ø Services are based on a commitment with fixed and regular schedules
Ø Ships must sail even without cargo on board.
Ø There is a high fixed cost to operate regular services. Most costs are
fixed, cargo handling costs are variable costs,
Ø Self-regulated industry. No regulatory barriers for new entries
Ø Inelasticity of supply and demand.
Ø Subsidization from governments for some liners in shipping and
shipbuilding.
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Ø Information and communication technology is more important than
that of tramp shipping.
Ø The imbalance of trade causes the imbalance of equipments
Ø Service deployment or withdrawal is on large scale (network,
capacity)
Ø An international business, therefore the liner business is subject to
national, international law and regulation.
v Organizational features
Ø Liner companies are large and complex with a network of offices and
agents
v Contractual features
Ø Sometimes, there is no contractual document signed between parties
before shipment and the bill of lading is the transport document.
v Commercial features:
Ø The tariff system is too complicated which may combine both the
FAK rate and the commodity rate.

Like other shipping market segments, liner shipping is also governed by the rule of
supply and demand. Since 1980, the world has been changing quickly and liner shipping
has evolved into an international and complex industry. Liners have been struggling to
maximize profits and minimize costs through many strategies and industrial trends.

2.1 Global container shipping:

Container shipping has proved to be a high efficient means of transport with a low cost,
fast transit time and low risk. Thanks to the globalisation process, the lifting of trade
barriers and the development of new technologies, the cost per TEU has decreased
annually. This has paved the way for containerisation to come into other shipping
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sectors, which used to be served by bulk shipping. During the period 1980-2001,
container shipping has penetrated the bulk market The total world sea-bone trade
increased on average at 2-3% per annum (Stopford.M, 2002a, p.2), in which the
container traffic grew on average at 6-8% per annum while the bulk trade grew 1-2% per
annum only (figure 1).
Figure 1: The growth of the container trade

Source: Clarkson (2002), http://www.clarksons.net/

According to the table 1, the world container traffic has increased steadily since 1980. In
1980, the world container traffic was only 37.2 million TEU. In 2001, it was 236.5
million TEU and 6.4 times larger than it used to be.

Table 1: The world container traffic 1980-2001
Year

World Container Percentage
Traffic (million TEU)
increase
1980
37.2
16.3%
1981
40.9
9.9%
1982
42.8
4.6%
1983
45.6
6.5%
1984
53.3
16.9%
1985
55.9
4.9%
1986
60.9
8.9%
1987
67.3
10.5%
1988
73.8
9.7%
1989
78.5
6.4%
1990
85.6
9.0%
Source: Combined from CI

Year World container
Percentage
Traffic (million TEU)
increase
1991
93.6
9.3%
1992
102.9
9.9%
1993
113.2
10%
1994
128.3
13.3%
1995
137.2
6.9%
1996
147.3
7.4%
1997
163.7
11.1%
1998
171.5
4.1%
1999
203.2
18.5%
2000
225.2
10.8%
2001
236.5
5.0%
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The major markets of containerisation are North America, Asia and Europe. The health
of those economies creates impacts on the development of container traffic. In the 1980s,
the United States of America adopted a policy to stimulate the domestic consumption,
so-called ‘’Reaganomics’’ (Jamri, 1990, p.3) that increased the consumption
expenditures and created more trade in the world.

Especially, in Asian countries

(Taiwan, Korean, Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia), trade grew tremendously
because their economics are largely dependent on exports to the USA.

In the 1990s, the world changed faster than ever because of: the globalisation process,
the emergence of Asian ‘tigers‘, the policy developments of the USA, the EU countries
and others. Trade agreements among countries or in the region have been adopted like
GATT (WTO), EFTA, and AFTA. These agreements have facilitated the movement of
cargo around the world. North America, Asia and Europe are the three biggest markets
for containerisation (see figure 2). As the major trading partner of the USA and EU, Asia
appeared as the area with the strongest growth and the Intra-Asia lifting increased all the
time with hundreds of shipping companies operating services.
Figure 2: Regional container lift and world container fleet capacity

Source: Clarkson (2002), http://www.clarksons.net/
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Ma (2001, p.14) emphasizes that ‘’the shipping industry has been the sector where
probably the most significant in productivity has been experienced during the last 40
years’’. The developments of containerisation and new technology have been the main
factors that contributed to the increase in the size of the containership.

Since the first generation of container ships deployed in service in 1964, containerships
have passed to the 5th generation nowadays (table 2). The economics of scale forced
carrier to pursue large ships and tonnage. People in the industry are now discussing the
mega-ship of 10,000 TEU or 12,000 TEU. However, many people are wondering about
this application, as it may turn out to be a ‘dis-economy of scale’ if the ship’s allocations
are not fulfilled.

Time
1964-1967
1967-1972
1972-1984
1984-1995
1995- now

Table 2:The growth of the containership’s size
Generation
Capacity (TEU)
st
1 generation
1000
2nd generation
1500
3rd generation
3000
th
4 generation
4500
5th generation
6000 and over

Source: Author compiled from Drewry

In the 1970s, liners preferred to use multipurpose ships or Ro-Ro ships for carrying
containers. Thus, specialization in the shipping industry has made the carrier specialise
their fleet to the fully cellular ship. The fleet of cellular ships increased by 144%
between 1980 and 1990, while the total world fleet capacity increased by 111% (Drewry
1991, p.65). In 2001, most of the liner fleets were cellular containerships in which the
top 20 liners held 83% of the total world cellular fleet (Willmington. R, 2002, p.7).

All the liners wanted to achieve a so-called ‘’economics of scale’’ by ordering new,
bigger ships. The number of bigger ships increased tremendously as figure 3 illustrates.
In 2001, according to the CI data bank, there were 155 ships (5,000 TEU plus capacity)
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and 435 ships (3,000-4,999 TEU capacity). The post- panamax fleet is continuing to
grow and the mega ship (over 10,000 TEU capacity) may be introduced into services in
the coming years.
Figure 3: Container fleet by size

Source: Clarkson (2002)
However, Stopford (2002, p.4) revealed: ‘’the average ship size is not always increased’’,
the average size being 2,200TEU in 1988, 1800 TEU in 1992, 2200 TEU in 1998 and
3300 TEU in 1999-2003 (order book included). At the CI conference in April 2002,
Stopford emphasized that the unit cost could save 20% by increasing the ship size from
1000TEU to 2000 TEU, by 7% from 2000 TEU to 4000 TEU and only by 4% from 4000
TEU to 6000 TEU (see figure 4) (‘Size is not everything’, June 2002)

Figure 4: Economics of scale

Source: Clarkson (2002), http://www.clarksons.net/

10

In the new building market, the prices of new buildings have slightly decreased (see
figure 4) as the result of the moving orders from European shipyards to the Asian
shipyards in Japan, Korean and China.
Figure 5:The new building price of container ships

Source: The Platou (2002), www.platou.com

The main reasons for this shifting are: the reduction of EU subsidies to the shipbuilding
sector, the labour relation problem in European shipyards during the 1980s and the high
productivity, the lower cost of Asian Shipbuilders.

Despite the increase in the world container traffic and the low price of new buildings,
the profitability in liner shipping was under expected. The freight rate has decreased
over time, ocean freight now accounts for a small portion (around 2% or less) of the total
cost of cargo transported. According to the analysis published on CI-online recently,
between 1993-2001, the freight decreased at an annual rate of ‘’5% on the transpacific,
4% on the transatlantic, and 6% on the Europe/Asia’’ (Déjà vu, June 2002).
In the period 1980- 2001, container shipping has been underwent many changes on both
the supply and demand sides and liners struggled for survival in the game by
implementing many shipping strategies to adapt to the situations. Some failed and were
out of the game while others continued to develop. In the next part, the main liner
shipping strategies during 1980-2001 will be examined in order to reflect their response
to the changes.
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2.2 – Liner shipping strategy:

‘Shipping is a highly volatile business’’ (Wergeland.T 1992, p. 541). Indeed shipping is
a high-risk industry, one can earn a lot of money in this month but he can lose all in the
next month if the wrong decision on investment, strategy was chosen. The container
shipping is even more risky, as Sir Yue-Kong Pao, former chairman of world wide
shipping, once described as ‘’a poker game – you just have to keep putting more money
on the table which you are about to lose’’ (Drewry 1991,p.9)

Nowadays, liners have been seeking many ways in order to survive and to be profitable
in the game. There are many individual strategies taken by liners, however there are
some main areas of conceptual and organizational strategies where carriers have to make
decision:
Ø Conference or non- conference
Ø Alliance/ consortium or solo
Ø The ownership or outsource
Ø Global carrier or niches carrier
Ø Total logistic provider or ocean carrier
Ø The routing option: RTW, Pendulum, End-to-end, Hub-spoke or
direct call service.
Ø The yield management

2.2.1 Conference or non- conference:

As mentioned above, the liner services are based on the commitment of fixed schedules
and regular services. In the past, there were some liners deployed on services when the
trade was profitable and withdrawn when the trade was weak. This caused an unfair
situation for other liners and of course to the traders. Beside, the fierce competition and
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the lower ROI (return of investment) also pushed liners to cooperate in order to stabilize
the market, to minimize cost.

During the period 1980-2001, shipping lines have much enjoyed the umbrella of the
freight conference system, which helped them to maintain and stabilize the freight
market. The conference and rate agreement was said to: ‘’have been about as effective
in halting the drop [freight rate] as a parasol for a skydiving elephant’’ (‘Conference
countdown’, 1998, p.24)

Today, the number of freight conferences has been reduced in comparison with that of in
the last decades, however they still remained and have impacts on the major trades. The
reasons for this decrease are not only due to regulatory requirements but also from the
strong growth of non- conference members. The period 1980-2001 witnessed the change
in the freight conference system through the regulations: the 1984 Ocean Shipping Act
(for the right of independent action), 1998 OSRA- Ocean Shipping Reform Act
(individual contract), EC regulation 4056/86 (Block exemption in relation to the EU
competition rules).

There were two types of conferences: open and closed conference, but the closed
conference was abandoned by the EC and USA. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the choice
to be a conference member was also based on the regulatory requirement of the different
law system:
Ø US Trade: (open conference)
A liner was entitled to join any conference provided it satisfied the
membership’s requirements.
Ø Europe trade: (close- conference)
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The closed conferences controlled the admission of new liners by the
various stringent requirements: market share, service quality, etc.

The conference system has both disadvantages and advantages in view of liners:
v Advantages:
Ø Controlling, managing the capacity and facilitating corporation
among members for minimizing cost and expanding services.
Ø Providing a stable rate, regular service and efficient capacity to the
traders
Ø Creating one voice to authorities to protect member’s interests.
Ø Offering security to the carrier for capital investment.
v Disadvantages:
Ø Strictly binding conference rules and arrangements (freight and
capacity) thus not being flexible for a liner to change its strategies
(operation, marketing, sale and pricing) when there was suddenly a
change in demand or supply side or when the liner wanted to take
independent action for any rate item.
Ø Application for being a conference member was (sometimes) a long
process
Ø Costly, bureaucratic
Ø Being the objects of some authorities and organizations like OECD,
shipper councils, etc to claim for the antitrust exemption.

A liner decided to be a conference member or outsider based on its policies and the
company’s objectives.
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2.2.2 Alliance/ Consortium or sole:
The need for co-operation among liners is more demanding than that in any other
industry due to the liner shipping’s characteristics and the changing of the global
economy. In 1972, the first consortiums named TRIO (included OCL, BLC, Hapag
Lloyd, MOL, NYK) and ScanDutch (East Asiatic, Tran-Atlantic, Wilhelmsen, Nedloyd
and CGM) were formed and those lasted till the early 1990s. Two consortiums operated
in the different philosophies. For TRIO, members had their own marketing policy and
the neutral body- the TRIO Tonnage Center, controlled the ship schedule and allocation
arrangement. For ScanDutch, consortium members created the new marketing
organization and sold services under the consortium brand, in each country one member
was nominated as the liner agent (Drewry 1991, p.25).

Passing over time, only TRIO ‘s philosophy remained and became the liner consortium’s
standard. In the 1996, the concept of strategic/global alliance was developed from the
TRIO consortium philosophy with the new alliances in the industry- the Global alliance,
the Grand Alliance, Tricon, Maersk- Sealand (see table 3).
Table 3: The alliances in shipping from 1996-2001
Alliances
1996
2001
The Global Alliance
APL, MOL, OOCL,
APL (NOL), MOL,
(The New World Alliance)
Nedlloyd, MISC
Hyundai
Grand Alliance

Hapag Lloyd, NOL, NYK,
P&O

Hapag Lloyd, MISC, NYK,
OOCL, P&O Nedlloyd

Maersk-Sealand

Maersk, Sealand

Maersk- Sealand, Safmarine

TRICON/HANJIN
(United Alliance)

ChoYang, DRS-Senator,
Hanjin

Senator, Hanjin, USAC

Cosco/K-line/Yangming

Cosco, K line, Yangming

Source: compiled from various sources
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The parties in the alliance agreed on the full operational integration, employment and
utilization of vessels in the global scale. The pros and cons of joining
consortium/alliance can be summarized as below:
v Advantages:
Ø Maximizing the use of capital investment
Ø Achieving economies of scale in deploying bigger ships in service
that an individual carrier alone could not fulfill her capacity and
achieving bargaining power for operational costs and expenditures.
Ø Offering more frequent, reliable services
Ø Improving the quality of services
Ø Sharing the use of other assets: vessel, port, terminal, equipment, etc
Ø Taking other advantages to penetrate the new market
Ø Being able to offer global services to global customers
v Disadvantages:
Ø Causing problems in balancing member’s interests
Ø Holding dissimilar views as the gap of different cultures
Ø Falling into the dilemma if a member was merged or took over by
another or went bankrupt.
Ø Binding by the alliance rule and requirements
Ø Being in-flexible in changing liner strategies
Ø Being a homogenous service, cargo booked to different liners will be
loaded on the same ship, transit at the same hub and get the same
service

Minimizing costs can be better achieved by joining an alliance Mr. C.C Tung, CEO of
Orient Oversea (International) Ltd, revealed: ’’carriers today are not only under pressure
to achieve further cost reduction but also need to match the cost efficiency of the largest
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existing carrier group’’ (Damas.P, 2002 C). However, one of the biggest obstacles is to
choose a consortium/alliance partner as Mr. Lim How Teck, NOL’s chief executive
officer, in the interview with Containerization International in 1990 emphasized: ’’a
consortium work best when all member are the same, preferably small size. Then they
all need each other. If members are of different sizes, the thing will not work. The bigger
will know they can live without smaller’’ (Drewry, 1991, p.26)

2.2.3 The ownership or outsource:

During the period 1980-2001, many decisions on ownership or outsourcing, buying or
leasing have been seen in the industry. These varied from company to company, and
were based on various factors like: subsidiary of government, the cost of finance, the
taxation system, cash flow considerations, off balance sheet financing, etc.

The assets, in which liners have to invest are the hardware and software (containership,
containers, chassis, trailer, port, depot, wagon, computer, regional office, administrative
office- ship management, etc). Wergeland (1997, p.565) remarks: ’’to have success in
shipping, timing is everything’’. Indeed, to choose the right option ownership or
outsourcing is dependent on the time and various situations and found ‘’through
competitive advantage analysis’’ (Shuo Ma, 2001b, p.14). We shall examine those two
options as follows:

Ownership
v Advantages
Ø Increasing liquidity if the assets acquisition was taken at the right time
Ø Creating the image of being more committed to the market
Ø Being more flexible in changing operations, management of assets
Ø Creating synergy for overall activities
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v Disadvantages
Ø Increasing capital for investment and maintenance assets
Ø Being less flexible to change

Outsource
v Advantages:
Ø Reducing capital investment
Ø Achieving economics of scale, expertise, know how from the third parties
Ø Concentrating on the core business
Ø Controlling costs more easily
Ø Being more flexible in changing strategies
v Disadvantages:
Ø Depending on the other’s operations, less controlling over assets
Ø Considering as being not service committed in the long run.
According to Mr. Poon, managing director of OOCL, ownership or outsource decisions
are taken based on two fundamental criteria: ‘‘first, unless you can provide the same
product or service at a cheaper cost, you must outsource it. The second criteria is not to
over invest, because if the assets or service is not appreciated by the customer, they will
not pay for it’’ he also emphasizes that ‘’we have to build our capabilities not our
capacities’’(‘Poon aims…game’, 1999, p.10).

Container shipping is asset based and a network industry. The unpredictable volatility of
earnings and assets values reflects this high-risk shipping industry. Generally, in other
shipping segments, the successful company is the one who has “maintained liquidity
capacity by trading ahead of the market” (Drewry, 1983 page 25). This means, one can
purchase a ship at the bottom price and sell it at the top of the market. If the ship is
purchased at the bottom price, it will have a competitive advantage (lower fixed costs) in
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comparison with that of a similar ship bought at a higher price. However, this
effective/famous philosophy could hardly be applied to container shipping where liners
have to keep vessels in the regular service and cannot withdraw a vessel for ‘‘asset
play’’. So in container shipping, the question on the asset option: ‘Ownership or
Outsource’ should be considered very carefully and is a strategic decision for the liner.

Liners operating on the main routes usually own a fleet. By doing so, they can enhance
their image in the market as the long-term service provider and that is crucial in the
marketing process. Some liners prefer acquiring new buildings (Maersk, APL, MOL, etc)
others prefer second hand ships (MSC). There is a trend in the industry that a liner
acquires a ship then sales it and leases it back. This method shows an effective way of
combining the advantages of: asset play, owner ship and outsourcing. A ship owner can
make a profit from the new acquisition when the market is low or there are favors from
the tax regime, then sells the ship when the market is high and leases it back for its
operation without interfering with its regular services.

Port, terminal activities and value added services could bring better ROI (Return on
Investment) than that of sea transport. Therefore, liners are trying to own depots,
terminals and other inland facilities in order to create a synergy for their business and
‘‘provide a very high quality end-to-end service’’ according to Mr. Kjaedegaard, senior
vice president of MSL. (Beddow.M, 1999, p.46).

The liner service is required to have a network of offices. The question of establishing
an in house office network or nominating agency is also quite important to decide. When
the cargo volume and trade activity is sufficient enough, it is better to establish an in
house office. However the ‘‘controlling’’ idea in selling, commercial and operational
activities is privileged. More and more liners are setting up their in house offices instead
of appointing an agency.
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2.2.4 The status option: Global carrier or niches carrier

At a matter of fact, together with a liner’s ambition, if the liner has good financial
capacity, it may want to expand its service to all major trades of the world and to be
global carrier. In case, if they have limited financial resources, they will satisfy
themselves to be a niche carrier. However the questions of ‘‘is big or small beautiful’’
or ‘‘is it necessary to be small in every market or big in a few?’’ are really a pivotal
matter of liner strategy. In the 1980s and early 1990s, people said that the North –South
trade was for niche carriers as those trades were so ‘‘specialized that was not suitable for
global carrier’’ (Damas.P, 1991, cover story) and the East-West trade was for global
carrier. Actually, there is no firmly definition or concept about the global carriers, but its
main characteristics are:
ü Strong corporate branding
ü Present in all major trades: East –West, North South
ü Value added services
ü Market share
ü Financial capacity
ü Global commercial orientation and ambition

For the niche carrier, its characteristics can be summarized as:
ü Sufficient size to be profitable
ü Potential growth
ü Specialist market
ü Regional commercial orientation and ambition.
ü Strong market share
Shipping has changed to cope with the globalization process in both supply and demand.
To trade with the global carrier, customers can ‘‘be assured of high quality service world
wide’’ as Mr.Takashi.H, senior managing director of NYK stated and ‘‘expect a more
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long-term service from global carriers than from single trade operators’’ as Mr.Ikuta,
former senior managing director of MOL said (Damas.P, 1991, cover story). However,
other liners did not support this argument, Mr. Mikolajczak, deputy chief executive of
CMB, remarks: ‘‘shipper, even those moving into the global markets, sooner or later
will discover that no shipping company in the world is strong in every trade. Shippers
will always find ways and means to best suit their needs, which are not necessarily
through a one-stop-shopping global carrier’’(Damas.P, 1991, cover story). While many
liners want to be on the global scale like: Maersk-Sealand, MOL, NYK, HLCL, CMA,
Evergreen, etc some liners prefer to be ‘’big fish in several small ponds’’ and want to
call themselves the niche carriers (ACL for Europe-American, Delmas for EuropeAfrica trade). Recently the trend of M&A (Merge and Acquisition) continued on both
the supply and demand sides, with the result that there will be few liners in the world but
they operate on the global scale and are truly global carriers.

2.2.5 The service option: Multi-modal Transport Operator/Logistics Provider or
Ocean Carrier?

Since 1980, there has been a strong demand for multi-modal transport and the United
States of America became the flourishing land for multi-modal transport development.
In that decade, most liners wanted to be involved in multi-modal transport with the hope
of getting better revenues and offering more services to customers. In the early 1980s,
liners were involved in inland transport (road, rail and water way). In the late 1980s they
wanted to devote more value added services to customers by expanding their scope of
business to cover all the supply chain management. Liners wanted to create ‘one stop
shopping’, to offer total logistics from the production sites to the consumer sites. During
this period, we can see the changes in the terminology concepts, liners claimed
themselves to be Ocean carriers, Multi-modal Transport Operators, Container Service
Providers, and now to the Total Logistic Providers.
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Is it necessary to be in all the parts of the game ‘Supply Chain Management?’ Some
liners say ‘yes’ and others say ‘no’. The business philosophies of liners are more or less
different.

MSL, MOL, APL, NYK, PONL, etc re-branded themselves as the total

logistic providers. They wanted to expand more in the supply management chain while
other liners (Evergreen) wanted to concentrate on sea transport only. Still others are in
the middle of the stream in this option. Liners found opportunities in the supply chain
management as they could get higher profits from the logistics and value added services
offered to customers (Thorby.C, 2001, April). Therefore, we could expect more
diversification of liners into other transport modes.

2.2.6 The routing options

2.2.6.1: The round the world, end to end, pendulum, double dipping service:

One of the main problems of liners is how to increase the utilization of ships and
improve the slot earning capability. Beside many other strategies, to choose the best
suitable routing option can be the most effective way. There are four main routing
options: end -to-end, pendulum, double dipping and round the world service. End-to-end
is the traditional service in liner shipping, the pendulum operating as the end-to-end
service but through the intermediate market. In 1985, Evergreen and USL debuted the
round the world service (RTW) which covered the major trades with big capacity vessels.
Through the RTW service, they hoped that the vessel could get high utilization as she
carries cargo over from one leg of the service routes to another. Because of the
imbalanced trade, the technical and operational problems, now there are few liners
operating this type RTW service.

Choosing the right routing options should be based on the economic study of each liner
in accordance with their capabilities.
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2.2.6.2: Direct calling or hub-spoke service

The size of the ship has been increasing rapidly in order for the liner to achieve
‘economic of scale’. There are many reasons that bigger ships could not call at some
ports such as: insufficient cargo, draft restriction, minimizing the turn around time in the
port and reducing the number of ports served. Therefore, liners have to make their clear
decisions by choosing between two alternatives:
Ø The Direct calling
Ø The Hub-spoke service

When choosing one of them, various factors must be taken into consideration like:
Ø Cost comparison
Ø Cargo volume
Ø Political, technological reasons
Ø The ambition of liners
Ø The availability of feeder networks in the region
Ø Customer policy (transit or direct call)

Ma (2001a, p.89) remarks: ‘‘in many case, transshipment or direct call is an economics
decision’’ and liners have to make a comparison for the ‘‘total cost which includes ship
related costs and cargo related costs.’’

2.2.7: Yield management:

The liner business is a more sophisticated industry than that of others. People not only
need to utilize the allocation of ships, they need to consider the total cost of the business
(sales, customer service, vessel, terminal, inland transportation, equipment, overhead,
etc.). Nowadays, all liners want to devote a “ global service” to customers by deploying
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more ships and equipment. However, trade imbalance caused liners in the dilemma of
surplus or shortage of equipment. The equipment repositioning cost is a huge amount so
they try to cut the cost of repositioning by:
Ø Using cheaper cost ships and terminals to move empty equipment,
Ø Using affordable containers
Ø Pooling information, direct interchange (DIR) among the alliance
members
Ø Leasing or off hiring from the container leaser

However, in fact, these are negative ways of solving a problem when it has already
occurred. “Prevention is better than cure”, liners should have strategies and contingency
plans to reduce and avoid the imbalance of equipment rather than to pursue the abovementioned methods. The way out for this headache, a costly matter, is the yield
management strategy. Hapag Lloyd, MSL and others have implemented this yield
management effectively and successfully. By doing so they are now considered as one
of the most profitable liners in the world. The following are the key elements of yield
management:
ü All staff from the board of directors to simple staff are aware of the importance
of equipment control, inland operation in determining company financial success
ü To establish the yield management system for controlling the productive time of
equipment
ü To consider the “total cost “ of the business rather than isolated business
ü To classify customers to different categories and use different strategies for each
of them
ü To categorize customers for selecting the most profitable cargo based on a ‘'winwin” situation
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ü To negotiate with the customer for the best utilization of equipment for their
cargo; to have confidential negotiations of contract with customers.
ü To control the cost of inland haulage
ü To locate inland points (ICD, depot) for flexibility of shipment
ü To introduce an effective IT system to support the yield management
ü To have a database of the total cost structure of every point (inland and sea port)

Yield management is the best way that liners should implement for their operations.
There are many other strategies and management ways that liners have applied in
practice. Besides those above-mentioned strategies, liners also consider some strategies
such as: decentralization or centralization, M&A, diversification or specialization.

****************************************************

This chapter has gone through the development of containerization and some basic
strategies that liners have to take for their operations. All those strategies could lead to
the failure or success of a liner. ‘‘A poker game - you just have to keep putting more
money on the table which you are about to lose’’ (Drewry 1991,p.9). Yes, that is
container shipping where liners have to continue investing money into their operation
and hope to get it back. But things do not always go as they expected, shipping markets
are changing in circles. Some good years will be followed by bad years. Liners have to
take prompt and proper strategic decisions to get enough profit to cover the bad years.
All these things caused the ups and downs of the top 20 liners from 1980-2001 and the
next chapter will investigate those changes.
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CHAPTER 3
THE TOP 20 LINERS DURING PERIOD 1980-2001
AND SOME FINDINGS
3.1

The changing of the ranking and capacity development of carriers
during 1980-2001

In the back issues of various maritime publications such as: CI, Lloyd list, American
Shipper, Drewry reports, European Shipper Council, etc we can read the big titles
about the top 20 such as ‘‘the bigger have got bigger’’, ‘‘the top 20’’, ‘‘top cat’’, ‘’
leader of the pack’’, ‘‘top 20 boost share’’, ‘‘top 20 tighten their grip’’, etc. By
tracking the development in both capacity and ranking of the top 20-container
shipping liners, the top 20 is really a powerful force in the whole world container
shipping. The appearance and disappearance of liners in the list, besides external
environmental conditions, could be caused by the successful or failed strategies
which were taken by individual liners at a particular time as explained in chapter two.
Below, the development of the world container, top 20 fleet capacity and world
container traffic during the period 1980-2001 will be examined.

3.1.1 The period 1980-1985
After the peak period of 1979-1980, the world economy went into recession from
1980-1982 in which GDP growth fell from 2.2% in 1980 to 1.1% in 1982. The world
container traffic growth decreased from 16.3% (1980) to 4.6% (1982), however the
world container fleet continued to expand with a growth of up to 15% in 1982 (table
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5). As a result, the supply was exceeded demand and many vessels had to be laid up
as per research by the NYK research chamber revealed: ‘’ the container ship subsector, too, reflected the slacking of cargo on many route. At the end of 1982,full and
semi-container ship suspended from service on a long-term basis, or laid up, total
some 1.5m GRT or 53,000TEU'’ (Koike.Y, 1983, p.35). All liners faced the decrease
in demand and the world container fleet growth was – 1% for 1983.

Table 4: The development of ranking and capacity of the top 20 from 1980-1985
SEPTEMBER 1980
Carrier
Sealand
Hapag Lloyd
OCL
Maersk line
Nedlloyd
NYK
MOL
CGM
Evergreen
APL
OOCL
USL
BBS
Seatrain
ZIM
Yangming
ACT
K line
Safmarine
ACL
Top 20 Total
World Total
Top 20 Share

TEU
45,367
42,208
36,201
32,749
29,416
27,607
27,223
27,153
27,125
23,585
21,488
20,408
19,934
19,897
17,304
15,060
14,748
12,626
11,149
10,926

SEPTEMBER 1981 SEPTEMBER 1982 SEPTEMBER 1983 SEP TEMBER 1984
Carrier
Sealand
Hapag Lloyd
Maersk Lines
OCL
OOCL
Nedlloyd
MOL
CGM
NYK
Evergreen
APL
United State lines
BBS
ZIM
K line
Yangming
ACT
Safmarine
Korea Shipping Corp.
ACL

482,174 Top 20 Total
1,200,000 World Total
40.2% Top 20 Share

TEU
Carrier
47,000 Sealand
46,098 Hapag Lloyd
38,800 Maersk
37,653 OCL
34,178 MOL
31,116 OOCL
29,584 Nedloyd
28,524 NYK
28,497 APL
27,664 Evergreen
23,585 CGM
23,124 USL
20,021 Zim
18,090 NOL
14,640 K Line
14,573 BBS
14,536 Yang Ming
12,540 ACT
11,720 CMB
11,469 Safmarine
513,412 Top 20 Total
1,350,000 World Total
38% Top 20 Share

TEU
Carrier
51,846 Sea-Land
48,817 Hapag-Lloyd
45,500 Maersk
41,275 OCL
36,673 Nedlloyd
36,130 OOCL
31,193 MOL
31,133 APL
30,523 US Lines
28,998 Zim
27,974 NYK
24,194 Evergreen
22,102 CGM
21,600 Wilhelmsen
20,473 Yangming
20,021 K-Line
17,036 Star Shipping
14,151 NOL
12,956 POL
12,865 EAC
575,460 Top 20 Total
1,551,000 World Total
37.1% Top 20 Share

TEU
Carrier
60,302 Evergreen
49,816 Sealand
45,500 Maersk
43,986 Hapag-Lloyd
43,446 OCL
32,717 USL
31,659 Nedlloyd
30,523 MOL
29,956 OOCL
29,570 CGM
29,509 Zim
28,968 NYK
27,974 APL
22,633 NOL
20,728 K-Line
19,421 UASC
18,998 Yang Ming
18,610 BBS
17,896 POL
16,064 ACL
618,276 Top 20 Total
1,527,948 World Total
40.5% Top 20 Share

JULY 1985

TEU
Carrier
74,132 Evergreen
60,302 US Lines
56,100 Sea-Land
53,817 Maersk
49,480 Hapag-Lloyd
42,610 OCL
41,560 Nedlloyd
40,885 NYK
37,597 MOL
34,383 Zim
33,283 CGM
33,262 Cosco Shanghai
30,523 UASC
28,334 OOCL
27,120 APL
23,804 Yangming
23,409 K-Line
18,000 Star Shipping
17,896 POL
17,141 DSR
743,638 Top 20 Total
1,753,000 World Total
42.4% Top 20 Share

TEU
85,714
78,850
61,945
59,317
45,179
44,899
39,497
37,975
35,662
35,194
35,088
34,987
34,964
33,755
32,481
23,409
22,787
21,998
18,763
18,514
800,978
2,211,763
36.2%

Source: compiled from CI

In the list of top 20 from 1980-1983 (table 4), we did not see many changes in the
ranking of liners. Sealand was always the leader of the top 20 and Hapag Lloyd was
the second ranked. Coming to 1984, the total top 20’ s capacity increased
tremendously by nearly 20% from 1,52 million TEU (1983) to 1,75 million TEU.
Those increases in 1984 and 1985 were partly due to the new ships, which were
ordered from previous years, deployed in the service and partly due to the new
routing concept RTW- Round The World service introduced by United State Lines
(USL) and Evergreen. With the RTW service, USL and Evergreen brought a massive
capacity into the market. USL lines used 12 vessels of 4,258 TEU capacity while
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Evergreen ran 22 vessels of 2,728-2,982 TEU capacity in services. (Drewry, 1986,
p.61). The market had been already suffering with the over-tonnage situation but
now evens became more serious. Carriers faced with the hard time of capacity
surplus and fierce rate competition with those two RTW operators, were trying to
fulfil their big hungry ships. Two big lines - Sealand and Happag Lloyd were pushed
to give way the 1st and 2nd rank to Evergreen and USL. The surprise for 1985 was the
jump of Chinese carrier COSCO, being the first time in the list in 1980 but ranked
12th.

In the USA market, the US Shipping Act 1984 gave exemption for the conference
and recognized the benefit of the conferences system to the US sea-born trade. Thus,
in 1985, most of the carriers in the top 20 had joined the conferences: Trans-pacific
Westbound Rate Agreement–TWRA, Asia North America Eastbound Rate
Agreement-ANERA like: Evergreen, USL, MOL, NYK, K Lines, OOCL, NOL,
Hanjin, Zim, BBS, APL, Sealand, Lyke (Drewry, 1986, page 74-76). Between 19801985, the world container traffic increased by 50%, while the total world fleet
capacity increased by 84% and the top 20 capacity increased by 66% (table 5).
Table 5: The development of world fleet capacity, World container traffic 1980-1985
Year

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

World fleet
(‘000 TEU)

World cellular fleet
(‘000 TEU)

1,200
1,350
1,551
1,527
1,754
2,211

665
702
799
883
1,012
1,160

Top 20 fleet
(‘000 TEU)

World container traffic
(‘000 TEU)

482
513
575
618
743
801

37,200
40,900
42,800
45,600
53,300
55,900

Source: compiled from various issues of CI, Drewry

3.1.2: Period 1986-1990

In September 1986, the top 20 continued to increase their capacity by nearly 14% in
comparison with that of July 1985 (table 7). There were three main reasons:
Ø The increase in demand
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Ø The need to achieve economies of scale and reduce cost by new,
bigger ships with new technology
Ø The ambition of liners to increase their market share
However, things did not happen as the liners expected, as the lower unit cost of
bigger ships could be obtained only when most of the allocations were fulfilled.
Those, with the imbalance of trade, were the main causes leading US lines into the
bankruptcy at the end of 1986. In 1987, all US lines vessels were laid up or
withdrawn from service. That was a hard time in the market; few new orders were
placed and with an ageing fleet, the liner ‘‘had to sell operational expensive
container tonnage’’ (‘Period of transition’, 1989, p.13). So the top 20 capacity was
reduced from 910,894 TEU in 1986 to 873,042 TEU in 1987 and the growth rate
decreased by 4% (table 7)
Table 6: The development of ranking and capacity of the top 20 from 1986-1990
SEPTEMBER 1986
Carrier
Evergreen
United State line

TEU

JULY 1987
Carrier

AUGUST 1988
TEU

Carrier

SEPTEMBER 1989

TEU

Carrier

124,414 Evergreen
101,906 Sealand

TEU

SEPTEMBER 1990
Carrier

139,488 Evergreen
117,380 Sea-Land

TEU

105,760 Evergreen
96,383 Maersk

111,594 Evergreen
73,602 Sea-Land

130,916
115,367

Maersk Line
Sealand

66,731 Sea-Land
66,404 K-Line

67,528 Maersk
51,507 NYK

83,771 Maersk Line
69,882 APL

92,491 Maersk
74,016 NYK

94,703
78,148

MOL

54,641 MOL

49,328 MOL

65,229 P&OCL

73,533 MOL

70,334

OCL
Hapag Lloyd

50,578 NYK
50,465 P&OCL

44,398 APL
42,821 OOCL

54,059 OOCL
48,336 NYK

70,625 APL
69,206 OOCL

66,380
58,117

NYK
OOCL

45,262 Nedlloyd
44,839 OOCL

42,658 K-Line
42,457 Yangming

47,968 K Line
46,817 Nedlloyd

65,721 K-Line
65,331 Cosco

55,462
54,505

K Line

42,286 APL

42,124 Zim

45,751 MOL

63,364 Hapag-Lloyd

53,178

Nedlloyd
Zim

39,585 Hapag-Lloyd
35,813 Cosco

40,986 Hapag-Lloyd
35,507 Cosco

44,054 Hapag Lloyd
43,313 Zim

55,886 Hanjin
48,217 P&O Containers

49,621
49,368

CGM
Hyundai

34,480 Yangming
31,120 Zim

34,821 P&OCL
34,728 CGM

41,202 Yang Ming
38,987 Cosco

46,818 Yangming
46,601 Zim

46,817
44,916

APL
Yang Ming

30,900 CGM
29,549 UASC

33,375 Hanjin/KSC
30,193 ScanDutch

38,788 CGM
34,937 NOL

43,137 Nedlloyd
37,284 BSC

40,335
36,760

NOL

27,346 Hanjin

26,374 BSC

32,318 CMB

30,832 NOL

35,294

CMB
ACT

22,337 DSR
18,553 Hyundai

25,997 Nedlloyd
21,826 NOL

29,995 Hyundai
26,689 MSC

25,691 ScanDutch
24,831 SNCDV

32,948
31,204

Baber Blue Sea

17,862 NOL

21,218 Blasco

26,188 Hamburg Sud

20,406 CGM

29,040

Top 20 Total

910,894 Top 20 Total

873,042 Top 20 Total

1,044,604 Top 20 Total

1,210,858 Top 20 Total

1,173,413

World Total
Top 20 Share

2,571,000 World Total
35.4% Top 20 Share

2,723,238 World Total
32.1% Top 20 Share

2,787,900 World Total
37.5% Top 20 Share

3,021,289 World Total
40.1% Top 20 Share

3,168,294
39.0%

Source: compiled from CI

Evergreen was always the first rank in the list from 1986 to 1990, with an average
capacity growth of 9%. The highest growth rate of Evergreen was 23% in 1986
(111,594 TEU in service) and it became the biggest and youngest one of the
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independent giants. By late 1986 OCL, ranked in 6th position (1985), was taken over
by P&O and named P&OCL (see table 6).

The 20% growth in capacity of the top 20 liners was recorded at the end of 1988
(table 7). Sealand deployed a huge capacity, increased by 38% from 73,602 TEU in
1987 to 101,906 TEU in 1988 and overcame Maersk to the second position in the top
20. The Japanese liner MOL also increased by 32% of its capacity. However, the
most impressive increase was NYK, nearly 57%, to 69,882 TEU in 1988 from
44,398 TEU in 1987. The time of the bigger ship had come as the study of CI
showed that ‘‘approximately 46% of the slot in operation or ordered by the world’s
20 largest carries were on vessels of 2,500 TEU or over’’(‘Period of transition’, 1989,
p.8). The first ultra- panamax containership APL C-10s, 4,300 TEU was introduced
in the market in 1988 and even those vessels could carry more if six tiers were
loaded on deck. Going further, the big lines Maersk Line deployed nine 3,900 TEU
vessels (it could be 5000 TEU if the containers were stacked on desk). All other
carriers pursued that way and ‘‘the search for economic of scale with large vessels
shows no signs of ending’’ as this CI study concluded (‘Period of transition’, 1989,
p.8). The huge tonnage put in service during 1987 and 1988 had caused a great
imbalance between demand and supply. Major liners had increased their capacity at a
faster rate than the growth rate of trade. In the following years, they suffered much
from these impacts. The vessel ‘s utilization of most carriers was very low (on the
east west trades, except APL and Sealand who got the advantage of carrying US
military cargoes) and the imbalance of trade created more sinking costs for empty
container repositioning.

Some years before liners believed that a higher market share with cheaper rates could
bring more profits than that of the lower market share with higher rates and they
could make profits up on the volume carried. This strategy together with the overtonnage situation made the market collapsed and ‘‘they just destroy the prices. They
are not even covering the out of pocket costs’’ (Drewry 1991, p.73). Freight dropped
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and the question of profitability in container shipping was put on the table for
discussion. Coming to 1990, the top 20 fleet capacity was reduced by 3% (table7)
Table 7: The development of world fleet capacity, world container traffic 1986-1990
Year

World fleet
(‘000 TEU)

1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

2,571
2,543
2,788
3,021
3,168

World cellular fleet
(‘000 TEU)

Top 20 fleet
(‘000 TEU)

133
141
151
162
146

World container traffic
(‘000 TEU)

910
873
1,044
1,210
1,173

60,900
67,300
73,800
78,500
85,600

Source: combined from various issues of CI, Drewry

Liners were forced to seek increasing utilization and profit. The ways out could be:
the global network, cost effective control, information system, value added services,
inter-modal services, large/efficient tonnage and corporation among them
Participating consortia, joint service and slot charters could obtain the weekly regular
services, economies of scale and market coverage. Major carriers in the top 20 had
joined some forms of co-operation. Maersk Line, the most independently minded
operator, joined service agreement: with P&OCL in the Europe- Far East Trade; with
P&OCL and Sealand for Europe- WCNA service and with Sealand in the Transpacific trade. Even Evergreen had seen the benefit of chartering capacity in 1989.
However at the end of 1990, they were still ‘‘only one which did not appear to be
turning away from a consistently isolationist approach’’ (Phillips.F, 1991 p.5).
We can recognise the strong development and ambition of US carrier Sealand during
this time by inaugurating more tonnages and implementing a highly centralized
computer system. Sealand had invested heavily in capital for a computer system
network, software, and provided EDI links with its customers and used it as a
management tool (‘‘Distribution revolution’’, 1988, p.6). However, not all the liner
in top 20 were able or agreed to invest in that.

Recognizing the business opportunities and the business trend of ‘‘total distribution
services’’, in 1988, some of the top 20 liners continued to expand ‘‘total distribution
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services’’ like: APL, Sealand, Maersk lines, P&O, Hapag Lloyd, ACL, ScanDutch
and they had well–established distribution services (‘’Distribution revolution’’, 1988,
p.6). Entering to 1991, liners were in a bad mood about the uncertainties and changes
with the threat of the Iraq war and its impact on the world’s economy.

3.1.3: The period 1991-1995

During this period, the total world capacity, traffic and the top 20 capacity continued
to increase (table 9). From 1990 to 1991, the world container traffic continued to
grow at the rate of 9.3%, the total world fleet grew by 7%, while the top 20 capacity
increased by nearly 16% (table 9). Cosco increased its fleet with the surprising rate
of 64% from 54,505 TEU to 89,600 TEU, primarily through acquisitions on the
second hand market and held 5th rank. This time P&O grew by 52%. The third fastest
growth rate was 37% of NYK when it added its newly acquired Japanese shipping
lines TSK line (see table 8). That year marked the disappearance of ScanDutch, the
return of DSR and the first time appearance of French carrier CMA.
Table 8: The development of ranking and capacity of the top 20 from 1991-1995
SEPTEMBER 1991
Carrier
Evergreen/Uniglory
Sealand Service
NYK Line/TSK Line
Maersk Line
Cosco
MOL
P&O (OCL)
APL
K Line
Nedlloyd
Hanjin
Zim
Hapag-Lloyd
OOCL
Yangming
CGM
NOL
Baltic
CMA
DSR
Top 20 Total
World Total
Top 20 Share

SEPTEMBER 1992

TEU
Carrier
132,386 Sealand
118,376 Evergreen
109,540 Maersk
102,260 NYK
89,600 MOL
88,600 Nedlloyd
82,613 OOCL
65,638 ZIM
64,360 APL
64,200 K Line
62,615 Hanjin
60,166 P&O
58,600 Cosco
53,218 Hapag Lloyd
52,005 Yang Minh
39,615 CGM
37,613 UASC
37,000 Baltic
29,600 NOL
23,200 Scac Delmas

TEU
136,729
132,386
117,194
110,198
95,764
78,781
67,536
66,010
65,638
65,589
65,458
63,470
60,526
60,281
59,644
42,133
41,062
39,540
39,188
36,655

SEPTEMBER 1993
Carrier
Maersk Line
Sealand
Evergreen/Uniglory
NYK Line/TSK Line
MOL
P&O
K Line
Hanjin
Nedlloyd
Zim
APL
Hapag-Lloyd
NOL
Cosco
Yangming
OOCL
UASC
MSC
Hyundai
DSR

TEU
174,088
147,765
144,140
122,130
91,015
80,984
80,168
77,398
75,938
71,397
69,527
63,222
59,208
58,576
56,330
53,074
50,371
43,991
40,359
37,388

SEPTEMBER 1994
Carrier
Maersk Line
Evergreen/Uniglory
Sea-land
Cosco
NYK Line/TSK line
P&O
MOL
DSR-Senator Lines
Hanjin
Nedlloyd Lines
K Line
Zim
APL
MSC
Hapag-Lloyd
NOL
Yangming
OOCL
Hyundai
CMA

TEU
185,805
160,108
153,658
146,068
123,930
99,977
88,238
85,843
85,466
84,651
80,375
70,675
69,985
67,649
63,939
59,416
57,534
55,596
55,031
43,611

SEPTEMBER 1995
Carrier
Sealand
Maersk Line
Evergreen/Uniglory
Cosco
NYK Line/TSK
Nedlloyd
MOL
P&O
Hanjin
MSC
APL
Zim Israel Navigation
K Line
DSR-Senator Linie
Hapag-Lloyd
NOL
Yangming
Hyundai
OOCL
CMA

TEU
196,708
186,040
181,982
169,795
137,018
119,599
118,208
98,893
92,332
88,955
81,547
79,738
75,528
75,497
71,688
63,469
60,034
59,195
55,811
37,388

1,370,205 Top 20 Total
1,443,782 Top 20 Total
1,597,069 Top 20 Total
1,837,555 Top 20 Total
2,049,425
3,400,000 World Total
3,610,451 World Total
3,700,000 World Total
4,100,000 World Total
4,410,000
40.3% Top 20 Share
40% Top 20 Share
43.2% Top 20 Share
44.8% Top 20 Share
46.5%
Note: Cosco capacity included all the liner operating units of COSCO: Dalian Ocean Shipping co, Ghangzhou Ocean Shipping Co, Shang Hai Ocean
Shipping Co and Tienjin Ocean Shipping Co

Source: compiled from CI
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In 1992, the world economy was still in recession, the lower economic growths gave
container shipping in the hard time and put more pressure on liners to controll costs
and rationalize their operations. However, due to the purpose of securing the
economies of scale and operating efficiencies, the top 20 still placed more orders for
new ships. In July 1992, the top 20 ‘‘accounted for nearly 50% of the total world
order for containerships’’ (Boyes.J, 1993, p.5).
Table 9: The development of world fleet capacity and world container traffic 19911995
Year World fleet World cellular fleet Top 20 fleet World container traffic
(‘000 TEU) (‘000 TEU)
(‘000 TEU) (‘000 TEU)
1991
3,400
1,979
1,370
93,600
1992
3,610
2,098
1,443
102,900
1993
3,700
2,217
1,597
113,200
1994
4,100
2,531
1,837
128,300
1995
4,410
2,761
2,049
137,200
Source: combined from various issues of CI and Drewry

In 1992, there was a little change in the structure of the league: CMA, DSR were out
and gave way to UASC, Scan-Delmas. Sealand regained its position as the world’s
largest liner from Evergreen by increasing by 18% its capacity. Cosco fell from 5th
rank to 13th, the main reason being scraping of old tonnage.
The top 20 operated the bigger container ships. In 1992, the total capacity of the top
20 liners, (ship was larger than 3000 TEU) occupied nearly 30% (399,316 TEU) of
the total capacity deployed (1,443,782 TEU). They held 97.4% of all 3,500 TEU plus
vessels deployed in the global services. (Damas.P ,December 1992, cover story).

Maersk lines boosted its fleet by taking over EAC Ben in April 1993 and went above
Evergreen and Sealand to 1st place with a capacity increase of 49%. By deploying
more than 27% of its fleet capacity in 1992 (63,470 TEU), P&O quickly held 6th rank
and became the second largest European liner after Maersk Lines. Hanjin, the only
Korean carrier in the top 20, jumped from 11th to 8th position by increasing its
capacity by 18.2%. The first time appearance, MSC entered the league in position 18.
Its capacity was mainly acquired from the second hand market with a shipload of less
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than 1,500 TEU. The Chinese carrier- Cosco seemed to have a slow growth in those
years, even the capacity was reduced from 60,526 TEU (1992) to 58,576 TEU (1993).
APL dropped from 6th position to 9th position in 1993 (table 8).

Most trades were containerised and the world container traffic continued to grow
rapidly with a rate of 13.3% from 113,2 million TEU in 1993 to 128.3 million TEU
in 1994. The world fleet and top 20 capacity also increased by 11% and 15%
respectively (table 9). Cosco, the China State-owned container line seemed to have
deep pockets as they took deliveries of more than a dozen 2,500/ 3,800 TEU during
1993-1994 and acquired more tonnage from the second hand market (Fossey. J, 1995,
p.11). Cosco’s capacity was jumped to 146,066 TEU from 58,576 TEU in 1993,
nearly by 149%. It kept 4th position after Maersk, Evergreen, Sealand and put NYK
behind. An Asian carrier, Huyndai, entered in the league in 1993 at 19th position but
showed strong ambition to be a mega-carrier with a capacity increase of 36%. With
the merging of Senator and DSR, the new entity DSR-Senator comprised 85,843
TEU capacity in service and was ranked as 8th position. MSC, the Swiss based liner,
had self-affirmed its position in the list by deploying more 23,658 TEU and
increased by nearly 54% and was in 14th position

In 1995, the top 20 list changed in structure only, all the league’s members still
remained from the 1994 list. Liners had increased their capacity. Indeed, in order to
be in that list, a liner had to have nearly half of a million TEU capacity in service.
Sealand added more vessels and came back in the leader position. Nedlloyd and
MSC increased capacity by 41% and 31% respectively and moved up to the higher
ranks. 11.5 % and 7.6 % were the growth rates of the top 20 and world fleet capacity
while the world container traffic went up by 6.9% only (table 8). This means the
supply and demand was still imbalanced and most liners had to seek new strategies
or cooperation in the next period.
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3.1.4 The period 1996-2001

As a result of the increase in world trade and the penetration of containerisation into
the bulk cargo market, the world container traffic continued to rise with an average
rate of 9.6% from 1996 to 2001 (table 10). The world container fleet and the top 20
fleet capacity also increased on average by 8.7% and 13% respectively during this
period.
Table 10: The development of world fleet capacity and world container traffic 1996-2001
Year World fleet World cellular fleet Top 20 fleet World container traffic
(‘000 TEU) (‘000 TEU)
(‘000 TEU) (‘000 TEU)
1996
4,800
3,718
2,297
147,300
1997
5,270
3,563
2,618
163,700
1998
5,874
4,159
3,113
169,600
1999
6,021
4,237
3,345
203,200
2000
6,536
4,716
3,524
225,200
2001
7,270
5,353
4,245
236,500
Source: compiled from CI, Drewry

In 1995-1996, being forced to adapt to the changing business environment, a carrier
had to cooperate together through their newly established global alliances: Global
alliance (APL, MOL, OOCL, Nedlloyd, MISC), Grand alliance (Hapag Lloyd, NOL,
NYK,P&O), United alliance (Cho-Yang, Hanjin, DSR-Senator), Maersk- Sealand.
By doing so, ‘’a massive concentration of power was in the hands of a few carriers’’
(Boyes, J.R.C, 1996, p.V). While most of the lines in the top 20 looked for
cooperation, even Evergreen had seen some benefits of cooperation, Cosco still
operated in ‘‘total isolation’’ (Boyes, J.R.C, 1996, p. V).

By bringing an additional 23,242 TEU into service, Evergreen became the leader of
the list. Sealand increased its capacity slightly and accepted the second position.
Hyundai continued to deploy more capacity, climbing 7 ranks to 11th position and it
‘‘has made no secret of its intention of becoming a top 10 carrier by the year 2000’’
(Fossey, J, November 1996, p.42). MSC went over the traditional container liners:
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P&O, Hapag Lloyd and APL, and took 9th position. APL fell to 15th position and
DSR-Senator slumped to 19th (table 11).
Table 11: The development of ranking and capacity of the top 20 from 1996-2001
SEPTEMBER-96
Carrier
Evergreen
Sea-Land Service
Maersk Line
Cosco
NYK Line/TSK
MOL
Nedlloyd
Hanjin
MSC
P&O
Hyundai
Zim
Hapag-Lloyd
K Line
APL
Yangming
NOL
OOCL
DSR-Senator
CMA
Top 20 Total
World Total
Top 20 Share

SEPTEMBER-97

TEU
Carrier
205,224 Maersk Line
203,244 Evergreen
200,919 P&O Nedlloyd
183,726 Sea-Land
129,731 Cosco
126,415 Hanjin
117,114 MSC
115,815 MOL
114,160 NYK Line/TSK
100,243 Hyundai
97,652 Zim
92,772 Yangming
85,722 CMA-CGM
83,634 OOCL
81,262 NOL
81,229 CP Ships
77,937 K Line
76,419 APL
70,908 Hapag-Lloyd
53,229 Cho Yang
2,297,355 Top 20 Total
4,834,198 World Total
48.5% Top 20 Share

SEPTEMBER-98

TEU
Carrier
232,257 Maersk
228,248 Evergreen
221,531 P&O Nedlloyd
215,114 MSC
201,593 Hanjin
174,526 Sea-Land
154,185 Cosco
115,763 APL
128,154 NYK Line/TSK
112,958 MOL
98,086 Hyundai
96,145 Zim
89,658 CP Ships
85,940 CMA-CGM
85,664 Hapag-Lloyd
85,016 OOCL
84,198 K Line
79,918 Yangming
73,372 UASC
55,882 Safmarine/CMBT
2,618,208 Top 20 Total
5,270,000 World Total
49.7% Top 20 Share

SEPTEMBER-99

TEU
Carrier
346,123 Maersk-Sealand
280,237 Evergreen
250,858 P&O Nedlloyd
220,745 MSC
213,081 Hanjin
211,358 APL
202,094 Cosco
201,075 NYK Line/TSK
163,930 MOL
133,681 Zim
116,644 CP Ships
111,293 CMA-CGM
105,322 Hyundai
91,600 Yangming
90,879 OOCL
90,063 K Line
89,717 Hapag-Lloyd
79,840 UASC
59,331 CSCL
55,584 CSAV
3,113,455 Top 20 Total
5,874,443 World Total
53% Top 20 Share

NOVEMBER-00

TEU
Carrier
544,558 Maersk-Sealand
311,951 Evergreen
268,625 P&O Nedlloyd
225,636 Hanjin/ Senator
217,804 MSC
199,881 APL
189,016 Cosco
156,821 NYK /TSK
146,026 CP Ships
144,751 OOCL
133,006 CMACGM
127,147 ZIM
109,105 K Line
101,445 Yangming
94,967 MOL
90,228 Hyundai
88,283 Hapag-Lloyd
68,880 CSAV
65,535 CSCL
61,535 UASC
3,345,200 Top 20 Total
6,021,107 World Total
55.6% Top 20 Share

NOVEMBER-01

TEU
Carrier
644,185 Maersk-Sealand
345,726 P&O Nedlloyd
306,755 Evergreen Group
251,723 Hanjin/Senator
237,782 MSC
214,133 APL
209,927 Cosco
161,036 CMA-CGM
154,387 NYK/TSK
130,406 CP Ships
129,545 K Lines
128,999 OOCL
123,722 MOL
121,030 Hyundai
119,153 CSCL
109,520 Hapag-Lloyd
106,501 Yangming
87,060 Zim
75,735 CSAV
70,075 Hamburg Sud
3,727,400 Top 20 Total
6,536,841 World Total
57% Top 20 Share

TEU
692,574
381,481
355,100
301,378
300,543
244,934
239,958
187,497
167,588
160,206
148,794
147,204
144,799
140,979
115,570
122,327
121,323
114,217
91,803
90,757
4,269,032
7,270,000
58.7%

Note: Evergreen Group included EMC, Uniglory, HATSU, and Lloyd Trestino
Source: compiled from CI

The consolidation trend continued in shipping as ‘‘companies seek to survive by
wringing out more costs from their operation’’ (Boyes, J.R.C, 1998, p.5). This
caused a changing in the position and structure of the top 20. The US carrier APL
was taken over by Asia carrier NOL. CP Ships acquired Cast, Lykes lines and
Contship Container lines. P&O and Nedlloyd merged. Hanjin held 70% share in
DSR-Senator.
The new-comer to the league was Cho Yang (Korean carrier) with a capacity of
55,882 TEU. The Danish carrier, Maersk lines returned to first place and left far
behind the second ranked carrier Evergreen (280,237 TEU) in 1998 by a massive
capacity (346,123 TEU). Between 1998-1999, Maersk increased capacity by 72%.
Further on, by acquiring another US carrier Sealand in 1999 and Safmarine in 2000,
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Maersk- Sealand (MSL) has maintained its 1st place till now. There could hardly
have any change in the coming years as in 2001 MSL’s capacity was nearly twice the
size of its nearest follower- Evergreen (see table 10) and it still ‘’has over 108,000
TEU capacity due for delivery in 2003’’ (Willmington,R, 2002, p.7). Cosco kept
steady growth and remained 7th position in the top 20 through period 1998-2001. The
second and third positions during this period were always exchanged between P&O
Nedlloyd and Evergreen.
With the rapid and steady advances, MSC continuously kept the 4th position in
1998,1999,2000 and lost that rank to Hanjin when this Korean carrier increased
capacity by nearly 40% (84,676TEU) between 2000-2001. Japanese carriers (NYK,
MOL, K lines), with the characteristic of careful thinking, had increased capacities at
slower rates and accepted to be in the further down in the ranking. CSCL (China
Shipping Container line) entered the list in 1999 in 19th position (65,535 TEU) and
was the second Chinese carrier in the league. CSCL had strong ambition for market
coverage, it jumped from that position to 15th position in 2001 (115,570 TEU) with a
growth rate of 53% in comparison to its capacity in 2000 (75,735 TEU). While
Cosco seemed to be satisfied with its smaller growth rate, its country mate, CSCL
continued to place a massive order with the back log in 2001 being 105,000TEU
(Willmington,R, 2002, p. 7) and is expected to raise its rank further. In 2001, the
Korean carrier, Hanjin, overtook the position of APL, MSC and ranked in no. 4. This
jump was mainly due to the increasing chartered capacity of its subsidiary Senator
lines. (Heaney.S, 2001, p.25).

Carriers in the top league continued to increase capacity with the modern and bigger
capacity vessels. Most of the Post-panamax vessels have been deployed by the top 20
and ‘‘control of the world containership’s fleet is now increasing in the hands of the
top 20 carries’’ (Willmington,R 2001, p.6). In 2001,except for CP ship, CSAV,
Hamburg Sud and Zim ‘‘all top 20 carriers are now operating post-panamax tonnage
in their vessel fleets’’ (Willmington.R, 2002, p.6). In 2001, Hapag Lloyd introduced
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to the market the world’s largest container vessel the 7,500 TEU- Hamburg Express.
Other carriers have followed with such types of ships. Even, larger ships of 10,00012,000 TEU are expected to sail on deep sea in the years to come.

Coming to the end of the period, liners were faced with a very bad situation after a
short period of prosperity in 2000. A number of modern, large vessels had been laid
up ‘‘for the first time in the history of containerisation’’ as the result of the trade
imbalance and the drop in volume and freight rates on the Asia- Europe Route.
However, the top 20 placed ‘‘almost 75% of the [world] tonnage on order (1,544,462
TEU) to be delivered in the coming years’’ (Willmington.R, 2002, p.6). This year
marked the bankruptcy of Cho Yang; it had gone because of its outstanding
accumulative debts.

In 2001, most liners claimed al loss or their profitability decreased in spite of the
increase in the volume of cargo transported. Mr. Chris Bourne, managing director of
MOL (Europe) admitted ‘’2001 was a disaster’’(Damas. P, 2002 July, p.24). The
world container port traffic increased by only 5% in 2001 (table 10) compared with
10.8% in 2000 and 19.8% in 1999. The World trade is still slowly recovering after its
recession and the event of September 11 in the USA. The growth of demand did not
go along with the growth of supply.

The short prosperity in 2000 did not last long enough for carriers to accumulate
money for coming to the worst year 2002. Thus, carriers have been continuously
placing more new orders. This may cause the situation where ‘‘some companies
which are largely dependent on liner shipping out of the market altogether, either
though bankruptcy, or merge/acquisition by stronger players’’ (Boyes, J.R.C, 2002,
page 5).
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3.2: Some findings from the study on the top 20

3.2.1: The top 20 is controlling more world fleet capacity

The development of top 20 container liners has been reflected in the main picture of
the world containerisation in the last 20 years. All liners have regenerated their fleets
to cellular fleets, the workhorse of the liner industry, while other ship types ‘‘have
only a marginal supporting or niche role to play’’ (Fossey. J, 1995, p.11). Some
authors compared the top 20 fleet capacity with the total world cellular fleet and
voiced their concerns for the massive share of the top 20 liners over the world
cellular fleet. However from the author’s point of view, that share was shown in the
specialization trend in the liner industry (figure 6). Until now, in the fleet of some top
20 liners, they are still operating other types of containership like: multipurpose
vessel, Ro-Ro, Semi-container, Bulk-Container ship and barge carriers.

According to the survey of CI for 2001 (Beddow.M, 2001, November, p.63), the top
20 controlled around 83% of the world cellular fleet. It showed the high
specialization of the top 20 and the modern, efficient fleet that they are deploying in
services.
Figure 6: World container fleet and world cellular fleet
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Over the past 20 years, the top 20 liners have gradually increased their capacity share
in the world container fleet capacity from 40% in 1980 to 59% in 2001 (figure 7).
Those shares are not so high, but in consideration of the fact that there are hundreds
of shipping companies operating liner services in the world today, we can say that
the top 20 has been controlling more of the world fleet capacity. Thus, MSL with its
biggest capacity could occupy only 9.6% (as of year 2001) of the world total
container fleet so ‘‘the liner shipping industry is still fragmented’’ as Mr. Hansen,
global sales director of MSL, remarked in the liner seminar at WMU in March 2002.

Capacity (TEU)

Figure 7: World Fleet Capacity and the top 20 fleet capacity.
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3.2.2: Big is bigger
Coming back to 1980, the total world capacity was 1,2 million TEU and 7,3 million
TEU in 2001. After 20 years, the world’s fleet and top 20 fleet capacity was 6.1
times and 8.9 times respectively larger than it was in 1980. However if we take a
look at the capacity of the 1st rank in those lists we can recognize that in order to be
number one in 2001, a liners’ capacity was 15.2 times larger than it was in 1980 (see
table 12). The gap between the 1st rank and the 20th rank became bigger, being 4, 6
and 7.6 times in 1980, 1991 and 2001 respectively.
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Table 12: Comparison: World, the top 20 fleet capacity from 1980-2001
Year World Fleet Top 20 fleet 1st rank
20th rank
‘000 TEU
‘000 TEU
‘000 TEU
‘000 TEU
1980
1,200
482
45
11
(Sealand)
(ACL)
1991
3,400
1,370
132
23
(Evergreen)
(DSR)
2001
7,270
4,269
692
90
(MSL)
(Hamburg Sud)
Source: compiled from CI

For the individual liner, after 20 years, the big guy MSL increased capacity by 21
times, Evergreen’s was 13 times, Hapag Lloyd’s was 3 times and MOL ‘s was 5.3
times (table 13)
Table 13: The capacity development of some liners from 1980-2001
Year MSL
K line
MOL
HLCL
Yang Ming
‘000 TEU
‘000 TEU ‘000 TEU ‘000 TEU ‘000 TEU
1980
33
13
27
42
15
1991
104
69
83
57
51
2001
692
148
145
122
121
Source: compiled from CI

Some carriers wanted to be BIG and they showed their determination to be in ‘‘top
five‘’ within few years like CSCL (Fossey. J, November 1999, p. 43). Being in the
top 5 or top 10 global container operators, a liner has to increase capacity at a higher
growth rate than its rivals and a massive capacity must be added to the service.
Pursuing ranking may lead liners to forget their profitability. Not all liners agreed
that way, Dr. Maves, executive board chairman of Hamburg Sud, emphasized: ‘‘the
position is, of course, interesting to us, but form no part in our strategy. What is more
important for us is to make money, and be able to offer our customers a better service
than anyone else’’ (Beddow, M 2001, November, p.65). However, the ambition ‘‘to
be big’’ could not be easily controlled by a carrier itself. Like the case of Evergreen,
it had to stand position no. 2 after P&O Nedlloyd in 2001. This was due to the
political sensitivities in establishing direct services to China for this Taiwanese
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carrier. Even, Evergreen has had to sell their services under other brand names:
Lloyd Trestino or HATSU.

Taking the average growth rate of all liners in the top 20 since 1980-2001, we can
recognize that in order to cement a position in the list, a carrier has to increase
capacity at the annual rate of over 12%. The increasing modern fleet capacity on a
global scale, the implementation of IT in operations together with the value added
services of the top 20 liners have been creating the polarization between them and
the rest of the world.

3.2.3: Merger and acquisition help a carrier to jump to a higher rank

In the 1980’s, there were no major changes in the ownership of the top 20 liners.
Some liners in the top 20 acquired or held the main share of smaller size companies
like P&O and OCL in 1986, Evergreen and Uniglory in 1989. In the 1990’s the
major changes in the ownership among the top 20 were seen as a new trend in liner
shipping.
The need to be a global carrier as explained in the chapter two, has lead the top 20
carriers to consolidate through merging or acquisition. By doing so, they could
achieve economies of scale, an increase market share and create a global presence in
a quick way. In 1996, P&O and Nedlloyd held rank no. 10 and 7 respectively. By
merging together, they jumped to position no.3 in 1997. Maersk took over Sealand in
1999 and one plus one is two that made Maesrk-Sealand no. 1 in the market. For the
years to come, we could hardly see any other carrier who can overcome this big guy.

Merge and acquisition will continue to develop as carriers have to ‘‘cement their
position and safeguard their existence’’ (Heaney,S 2001, August, p.25). Baasch.H
emphasized that ‘‘the next wave is likely to bring together major liner carriers that
are already alliance partners’’ (Baasch. H, 1999 June, p.35). If this trend continues in
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the top 20, we will see more changes in the structure of the top 20 in which the
power will be in the hands of a few carriers and there will be a big gap between the
1st five ranking carrier and the rest in that list.
Table 14: Merge and acquisition in the top 20 liners
NYK
CMA
CP ships
Evergreen
Hamburg Sud
Hanjin
Maersk
NOL
P&O
P&O Nedlloyd
CSAV

Acquired
Acquired
Acquired
Acquired
Acquired
Acquired
Acquired
Acquired
Merged
Acquired
Acquired

TSK Lines
CGM, ANL
Lykes, Contship, Ivaran and ANZDL, Cast
Lloyd Triestino, Uniglory
Alliance, South Seas Steamship
DSR-Senator
EAC, Safmarine, CMB, Sealand
APL
Nedlloyd
Blue Star, Tasman Express, Harrison, Farrell
Montenmar

Source: Author compiled from various sources

3.2.4: The top 20 carriers have been increasing their chartered fleet

As explained in chapter two, one of the main strategies that liners have to decide is
‘‘ownership or outsource’’. The answer quite depends on the business philosophy of
each liner. Since the 1990s, we have seen the trend of increasing the chartered
tonnage fleet. In 1999, the charter portion of the global container fleet was 42% and
it would be around 60% in 2001 as some brokers expected (Fossey. J, 2000, p. 6).

Shipping has been long seen as a low remunerative industry because of its high
investment in assets (ship). This prevents the shareholders investing more in their
activities. Therefore, carriers have to make a healthy balance sheet and according to
Mr. Wakabayashi, senior managing director of K Lines: ‘‘it is very important that we
maintain a healthy balance sheet as financial analysts look at this as closely as they
do the profit/loss account’’ (Fossey.J May 1999, p.44).
By operating more vessels off-balance sheet on long term charter, as explained in
chapter two, carrier could concentrate its limited capital on other investments.
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Captain Sardis, managing director of COSTAMARE, the largest containership nonliner owner in the world, emphasized that ’’the operator that once invested in their
own ships now have huge capital requirements to support their move into logistics
ventures and terminals’’(Fossey. J, June 1999, cover story). Moreover, liners could
sell ships to their non-rivals and charter back at a good rate or they could order new
buildings against long time charter agreement with those third party owners. This
trend has created the soil for German and Greek owners to grow and now all the top
20 carriers are regular customers of those Greek and German shipowners. During the
author’s visit to COSTAMARE’s head office in March 2002, Captain Sardis and
Captain Fanis said that they believed more and more liners would find many benefits
from long-term charter deals with non- operating containership owners like
COSTAMARE.

Now in 2002, according to the table 15, all the liners in the league have chartered-in
capacity. Even some liners have high portion of chartered-in tonnage like: CSCL
(83%), CMA-CGM (64%).
Table 15: The share of chartered-in capacity on the total of individual liners’ fleet
capacity (as of June 26th 2002)
MSL

PONL

Share 37% 48%

Share

EMC

Hanjin

MSC

APL

Cosco

12%

57%

41%

46% 4%

CMACGM

NYK

K line

64%

33%

41%

OOCL

MOL

CSCL

HLCL

Yangming

ZIM

CSAV

Hamburg
Sud

UASC

48%

45%

83%

24%

21%

58%

98%

69%

2%

Source: c ompiled from CI.

3.2.5: The Asian carriers have dominated the top 20

Asia has been emerging as the centre for containerisation, not only by the number of
containers moved through the Asian ports but also by the number of Asian shipowners in the industry. We can see below the increase in container lifts in Asia,
increased every year at a stronger rate than that of other regions.
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Figure 8: Container lift by regions and percentage growth

Source: Clarkson (2002), www.clarkson.net

In the top 20 list from 1980 to 2001, the Asian carriers have been gradually
occupying the list and hold numerous shares in the top 20 capacity fleet. In 1980,
there were only eight Asian carriers but in 1990 there was 10 and in 2001 there was
12 (figure 9).
Figure 9: Regional breakdown of the top 20, based on the number of liners
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Source: compiled from CI

As a risky, un-healthy industry, container shipping seemed not to be of America’s
interest, in spite of the fact that it was born in America and invented by an American.
During this period, America had three carriers in the league but the US lines went
bankrupt in 1986 and the others were eaten up by European and Asian liners in 1998
and 1999. Americans are famous for their practical thinking, if a company does not
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make profit as expected, they will sell it or even terminate its operation. In the case
of APL and Sea-land, those liners brought less profits than that of other sectors. But
they were seen by NOL and APM as the gate to access to the US domestic service
protected by the John Act of 1924, and to the US military cargoes. Which were
claimed to be the most profitable segment of APL and Sealand.
The merging and acquisition of APL- NOL, P&O – Nedlloyd, Maersk-Seland
created opportunities for smaller Asian carriers to enter the league. Asian carriers
have been gradually swallowed up the top 20’s fleet capacity. They occupied 38%
share of the top 20 fleet capacity in 1980, 51% in 1989 and 53% in 2001 (see figure
10). With the trend of M&A (merge and acquisition) and the advantages of chartered
tonnage, more Asian carriers will push themselves forward into the venture in
container shipping. We may see more Asian carriers entering in the list in the coming
years and they will compete with other traditional liner shipping companies.
Figure 10: Regional breakdown of top 20 fleet capacity 1980-2001 (% share)
100%
90%
80%
Percentage

70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Year

US

EU

Asia

Other

Source: compiled from CI

3.2.6: Maintaining rank means increasing capacity, even unprofitably. Capacity
has increased as a result of the short prosperous periods in shipping

The capacity of the 20 liners continued to growth through 1980-2001 with the
average rate at around 13%, albeit a low ROI (return on investment) during this
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period. The battles for market shares made liners invest continuously in larger
capacity and services. Not like the other shipping sectors, liners are mainly
dependent on the actual operating for their profits rather than asset play and the
prosperity periods in liner shipping are ‘‘always forecast to be just around the
corner’’(Drewry 1991, p.61). The industry had witnessed the financial disaster after
the collapse of US lines in 1986, partly because of its optimistic forecast about trade.

During 1980-1990, the profitability of the major liners (APC, Sealand, CGM, CMB,
Delmas, Hapag Lloyd, K- Line. Nedlloyd, NOL and Zim) were very low and ‘‘the
return on assets for the full ten year period was only 0.9%’’(Drewry 1991, p.63). In
1992, CI conducted a study for the top 20 container carriers from 1987-1991 (see
more in the appendix A) and they found that the average net profit per total revenue
was 0.4% and the average net profit/total assets was only 0.4%. (Damas.P, 1992,
December- Cover story)

After a very short period in the early 1990s, very few carriers enjoyed a good time of
prosperity in increasing their profits (Bonney. J 1993, April, p. 48-M). However
those good times also attracted other liners to joint the game. To stay in this ‘’poker
game’’, carriers had to put more and more stakes on the table. More capacity had
been added into services and carriers expected anxiously for the good time to come
again. From 1995 to 1998, the market continued to suffer the capacity surplus,
imbalance of trade, the Asia economic crisis and a freight rate drop. In 1998 major
carriers in the top 20 had ROI (operating income/ assets) at the low rates like
Hyundai: 7.8%; MOL: 4.6%; NYK: 3.2%; Sealand: 5.4%; K Line: 1.1%; P&O
Nedlloyd: 3.47%; NOL: minus 2.04% and Yangming: minus 5.4% (Fossey, J, 1999,
October, p.39). Mr. C.C Tung, chairman and CEO of OOIL described the situation:
‘the combined effects of substantial new capacity being delivered in 1996 through
1998 and efficiency gains, by the re-structured alliances have, as expected, placed
great pressure on freight rates, driving down profit levels despite an increase in
volume carried’’ (Damas. P, July 1998, p.60).
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The good times had returned for carrier in 1999 and 2000, they had a golden year in
2000 and ‘’this time, it was hard NOT to make money’’ (Damas. P, July 2001,p.30).
Most carriers in the top 20 reported the high profits for their operation, except Yang
Ming, whose profit was down nearly 30%. The characteristic ‘‘a risky business’’ of
liner shipping had been proved this time, this prosperity lasting only around 12
months. In 2001, most of the carriers claimed a loss or decreased rapidly their profits
(Profits fell: APL- 93%, APM’s tanker and liner: 63%). ‘Market collapsed’, ‘freight
rate down’, ‘capacity surplus’, ‘utilization down’, ‘trades imbalanced’ were the main
issues at this time. For the fiscal year 2001, many liners reported a loss. (See
appendixes B, C). However, more capacities have been deployed. Only in the top 20,
the capacity increased by 15% between 2000 and 2001 and they have nearly
1,157300 TEU tonnage on order to be deployed from 2002 (Willmington.R, 2002,
p.6). The situation, as Mr. Jacobs, CEO of NOL, analysed: ‘‘Due to the double-digit
increase in container vessel capacity that was to be added globally, freight rates were
already beginning to soften in late 2000, but they deteriorated significantly during the
year, reaching unprecedented and unsustainable levels in some trades" (Damas. P,
2002).

Despite very bad financial results, some carriers still pursued a capacity increase. Mr.
Kelin.L, president of the China Shipping Group once stated that "despite the difficult
market situation, CSCL has established itself as one of the top 20 carriers in the
world", albeit CSCL ‘‘made a heavy pre-tax loss of 1.1 billion Renmibi ($136
million) in 2001’’ (Damas. P, 2002). In 2001 CSCL had a backlog of 105,000 TEU
to be delivered from 2002 (Willmington.R, 2002, p.6)

Appendix D shows the growth of world container traffic. This growth evolved in a
cycle and made capacity increase be the name of the game. Usually, if nobody orders
any new ship, supply and demand will be balanced. If one places new orders, its
rivals will try to order too. Finally, the market will soon be flooded with new tonnage
and carriers will suffer from those decisions.
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3.2.7: Profitability is not correlated with a company’s size

When considering the correlation coefficient between the total revenue (could be
present for a company’s size) and the portion of operating profit per total revenues
(profit margin), for example the financial result for 2001 (figure 11), it is revealed
that there is no correlation coefficient between the size and the profit. The bigger
shipping companies are not always able to make greater profits than other smaller
companies.

The capacity expansions offer both risks and rewards to liners. ‘‘The big or small is
beautiful’’ could not be always answered from the theory. We can recognize that the
‘‘small’’ company, ACL, is one of the most profitable shipping company. Recently,
while other big guys claimed losses, they are still making money. For Hapag Lloyd,
they used to be No.2 in the world, they accepted the slow growth in capacity and
lower ranking they are also one of the most profitable carriers in the top 20.

The portion of operating profit/
Total revenue (%)

Figure 11: Carrier size and profit margins in 2001- No correlation
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Note: All figures are adapted appendix 3. See that appendix for further notes.
Source: Author, compiled from American Shipper (2002), www.americanshipper.com

**************************************************
Through the period 1980-2001, the industry has seen the ups and downs of shipping
companies in the lists and changes the business environment. Twenty years is not a
long time and the liners have strived to implement their own strategies for survival.
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The top 20 liners are the driving forces of the industry and they present the
development of containerisation. If an outsider of the industry sees the annual
revenues of one of the carriers in the top 20 and the carrier’s appearance of ‘’good
order and conditions’’, they may think that container shipping should have been
profitable and carriers are making a lot of money. But sometimes,

‘‘container

shipping is, in fact, a lot less healthy than it should be, than it could be, and than it
usually gives the appearance of being’’ (Drewry 1991, p. 61).
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CHAPTER FOUR
ANALYSIS OF SOME SELECTED CARRIERS
In chapter two and chapter three, we examined the general situation of container
shipping, some main liner shipping strategies and the development of the top 20 from
1980 to 2001. During this period, some carriers were very healthy, self-affirming
their positions in the market and others went bankrupt or gradually slipped behind.
Those ups and downs of liners in the league are continuing to happen and expected to
evolve more in the future.

Besides the external conditions, the company management style and leaders with
their strategic decisions at a particular time also contribute to the success or failure of
a shipping company. Ma, in his lecture at the World Maritime University (Ma.S,
2002), analyzed that in the competitive environments, companies have to find their
competitive position whether to be a Market Leader or Market Challenger or Market
Follower or Market Nicher and apply their strategies respectively. According to
Professor Porter (1996, p.61) of the Harvard Business School, a company should
implement Operational Effectiveness (’means performing similar activities better
than rivals perform them’) and strategic positioning (’means performing different
activities from rivals’ or performing similar activities in different ways’).

Shipping lines may have different position in the markets but their services do not
have many differences than that of others. In the game of survival, liners have to
reorganize their operations in order to minimize cost, and try to perform better than
others.
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There are many shipping companies, which have special and successful strategies but
due to the limits of this dissertation, the author will analyze only some selected
carriers from the top 20 lists. The author will try to find out their management,
operational ways and their strategies. In which, those liners could make themselves
different from others or they are changing their strategies to respond to the market
trends.
Ø MSL: the biggest and a European liner
Ø MOL: the biggest Japanese shipping giant
Ø EMC: the Taiwanese liner and the biggest conference‘s outsider
Ø MSC: The emerging liners, an exclusive approach to liner shipping.
4.1: MAERSK- SEALAND
‘’No loss should hit us which can be avoided with constant care’’
(A.P. Moller in a letter to Maersk Mc-Kinney Moller)
4.1.1 – Historical background and general information

In 1904, Mr. Arnold Peter Moller and his father Peter Maersk Moller founded the
Steamship Company Svendborg with other shareholders to operate their first steam
ship the ‘’Svendborg’’ (Hornby.O, 1988, p.20). After overcoming many obstacles in
operating tramp service during the First World War, Mr. AP Moller decided to
spread the economic risks to the new shipping operation- Liner Shipping. Under the
brand name Maersk Lines in 1928, this new company operated in the main trading
areas: USA- Far East, Red sea- Mid East and the US East coast-Gulf coast.

In 1968, Maersk lines joined the container shipping in the Europe- Asia trades. With
the acquisition of EAC, Safmarine, Sealand in the 1990s, the new entity MaerskSealand became the biggest shipping lines in the world. Now MSL is part of the AP
Moller group. This conglomerate is engaged in shipping activities, aviation, oil/gas
production and exploitation, retail activities, IT, and industrial activities. The
development of Maersk Lines and Maersk-Sealand during the period 1980-200 could
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be partly reflected in their capacity and rank as illustrated in figure 12. In 1980, MSL
held 4th position in the list and Sealand held 1st position. Those two shipping liners
co-operated their services for quite a long time. Finally in 1999, Maersk took over
Sealand and became the biggest shipping liner in the world.
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Figure 12: The development of MSL fleet capacity from 1980-2001
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Container shipping is indifferent so MSL differentiated their services with others and
implemented both what are called ‘operational effectiveness’ and

‘strategic

positioning’. This is reflected in their mission statement as below:
Maersk- Sealand will:
•

In active cooperation with our customers deliver second to none, cost
effective

containerised

transport

solutions

in

all

significant

international trades of the world
•

Be a profitable leading global container carrier

All to be propelled by a continuous drive to assure a truly low cost operation,
highest service standard and active E-Commerce engagement
(Source: Nilesen.J.A.S, 2002)

4.1.2: A diversified shipping company
Shipping is a risky business. The profitability of the tramp and liner segments may
not go together at the same time. Therefore, it is better to spread the risks by
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operating both those shipping segments. For the AP Moller group, they operate many
shipping services: container, bulker, gas, tanker, car carrier, ship supply, drilling.
However, A.P Moller combined the P&L (profit & loss) account of two shipping
segments (tanker and liner) into one balance sheet. The ‘‘enigmatic’’ MSL did not
disclose separate balance sheets of the liner business with its tanker business, so the
outsider could only assess them from a distance.

Figure 13 are the financial results of MSL from 1992 to 2000. They made money and
the two shipping segments balanced each other. Mr. Steven Brooker, analyst for
Alfred Berg Bank, commented: ‘MSL has never yet produced a negative result’’
(Mitchell. D, 2002) and has the ‘’lowest unit costs in the industry’’.
Figure 13: MSL - Financial performance
TURNOVER

NET PROFIT

OPERATING PROFIT

*Notes: figure for A/s D/s Svenborg, D/s Af 1912
A/s and tanker & liners in partnership; operating
profit= result before financial items and
depreciation.
Currency: Dkr million
Source: Adapted from CI

Beside tanker and tramp shipping, the AP Moller Empire runs many other relatedshipping companies:
Ø Odense Steel Shipyard
Ø Maersk Container Industrial AS (Container manufacture)
Ø APM Terminals (the third largest termi nal operator in the world )
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Ø Maesrk Logistics
Ø Maersk Broker, Maesrk supply service, Maesrk Data, and others
All these activities have created synergy and cross subsidiary for this conglomerate
and for liner shipping in particular.

4.1.3: Decentralised organization and effective network

Nowadays, MSL is present in nearly 100 countries with 325 offices worldwide and
has over 10,000 employees. MSL’s headquarters is located in Copenhagen but its
operation is decentralized into six regional line management centres: Europe, Asia,
North & Central American. South America, Africa, and West coast Africa. By doing
so, each region has its authority to undertake their business activities. As Mr.
Kjaedegaard.J, senior vice president of MSL said that "they are able to expand the
business locally’’ (Damas. P & Gillis .C ,2000).

Engaging in liner shipping on a global scale, liners need to have a very efficient and
sophisticated network. Basically, if the volume of cargo is high enough, a liner
should establish its in house agent, otherwise it should appoint one party to be an
agent at that place. However, totally relying on an agent’s operation cannot meet the
high demands of the international customer or global customer. For MSL, they prefer
operating their own office in every place they are present and use an agent only
where the law of the local countries does not permit them to do so. In this case,
besides the agent’s activities, MSL sets up its own office and employs its own staff
to run daily business. As usual, the agency commission is calculated based on a fixed
percentage of freight rate and fixed amount of handling fees. For MSL, the agency
commission is based on the monthly lump-sum basis or fixed cap.

According to the author’s personal study conducted three years ago when making
comparisons between Maersk and other liners having an annual lifting of 15,00020,000 TEU in the Vietnamese market, Maersk lines could save at least USD
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100,000 per year from their exclusive agency arrangements. Sometimes, this way
costs more than that of the traditional agency authorization, however the most
important thing gained is to ensure the quality, reliable services, market commitment
and the global presence of MSL.

4.1.4: Building corporate culture

While there are thousands of academic centres for other industries, there are really
few centres for the shipping industry. It was believed for quite a long time that the
shipping man could only acquire his acknowledge from practice and there is no need
to train him in school. Yes, this was true, but for today’s competitive, global business
environment, this turned out to reveal some disadvantages. For MSL, ‘‘staff training
in all levels is clearly a high priority’’ (Beddow.M 1999, November, p.47) therefore
they established their own education system called: MISE- Maesrk International
Shipping Education, in Copenhagen. MISE has produced many skilful staff members
for the company and a shipping man, who is well trained, is not only a sales man but
also a consultant for customers when they are needed. MSL is proud of that and takes
this as the company’s competitive advantage. For that, Mr. Kjaedegaard- senior vice
president of Maersl said ((Beddow.M ,1999, November, p.48).
What you have to bear in mind that many of our sale representatives and sale
management staff today have come up through the company’s international
training programme, which requires two years at the Maersk International
school, followed by a defined career path through the organization’s various
department.
By training and employing very fresh, young people (usually under 25 years old of
age), MSL could make a ‘perfect machine’ in which staff will think in Maersk way,
do in Maersk way and MSL can create a corporate culture amongst staff. However,
from the author’s point of view, in the changing world today, MSL should also take
in more ‘diversified’ staff who may bring a new way of thinking and create ‘‘the
work of a mad-man’’ in view of ‘‘people who go only by the rule of book’’ as Mr.
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AP Moller commented on his successful action at the foundation of The Steamship
company of 1912 (Hornby.O, 1988, p. 56)

4.1.5: The industry influence and new technology application

As the biggest carriers, MSL has the bargaining power to leave its influence to the
industry. For that, a CEO of one of the top 20 carriers revealed: ‘‘when it [MSL]
comes to the terminals alone. All kind of vendors will have to ask what Maersk
wants before they ask everybody else’’ (Boyes, J.R.C 1993, September, p.37). The
move of MSL from PSA (Port of Singapore Authority) to PTP (Port of Tanjung
Pelapas - Malaysia) in 2000 proved this assessment. This action is a lesson for any
vendor who did not meet MSL’s requirement. By the way, this influence of MSL has
brought benefits to other liners somehow, because they can obtain lower costs from
the conservative terminal operator like PSA after this port lost MSL to PTP.
Moreover, if MSL enters the new trade, the market will be more competitive among
liners as MSL can offer lower freight rates with high quality service. No one can
deny the fact that now Maersk- Sealand is the leader of the industry and ‘‘wherever
Maersk line has a presence, it has a profound effect on how other lines
behave’’(Beddow.M December, 1999. p.45).

MSL runs ahead of its rivals in applying new technology on ships and ashore. The
modern equipment and latest designs make MSL’s ships C,M,L ,K class to be one of
the most modern fleets in the world. MSL is one of the pioneers in implementing IT
in shipping and now is a shareholder of the emerging portal- INTTRA.

4.1.6: Expansion
In the last decade, Maersk line acquired EAC and Sealand and APM too over
Safmarine. By horizontal acquisition, Maersk could expand the market’s coverage,
enhance the service quality and take the full advantages of other company’s strengths.
In the case of Sealand, Maersk took over Sealand with one of the main aims of
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accessing to the US domestic services and US military logistics, where foreign
shipping companies are prohibited by the US Johns Act. The acquisition of
Safmarine paved the way for Maersk to gain a market share, and a specialist in
Africa.

The AP Moller group has also seen a vertical expansion to the non-shipping
segments as the way of maximizing its profits. A.P Moller invested in ports,
terminals, logistics, and other value added services supporting transport activities.

Figure 14: World coverage of major container terminal groups in 2001

Source: Adapted from American Shipper (2002). www.americanshipper.com

At present the APM terminal is the third largest container operator in the world (see
figure 14). It operates 28 terminals and ports worldwide. This is really a cross
subsidy for the MSL business. Vertical acquisition and expansion enhanced MSL to
provide ‘‘high quality end-to-end services’’. Those expansions complement the core
shipping business and provide ‘’value for money deal’’ to the customer.

4.1.7: Branding campaign

It is said that ‘‘in the 21st century, branding will ultimately be the only unique
differentiator between companies’’ (Szatkowsky.M 2002). In the shipping, many
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companies consider money spent on branding campaigns and advertisements are
expenses. However for MSL, they considered it as an investment. MSL invested in
many campaigns in the media (TV, magazines) to build its brand and targeted the
trading company’s senior level decision makers for their selecting MSL as their
business partner (Szatkowsky.M 2002).

It is hard to measure the impacts of those campaigns but nobody in the market has
never heard of the Maersk-Sealand brand.

4.1.8: A solo, independent player

Having experienced difficulties in obtaining a unanimous business opinion of other
partners since the operation of the Steamship Company Svendborg (Hornby.O, 1988,
p.15), Mr. A.P Moller and his followers preferred to be independent in their business.
MSL is a solo player on main routes and Mr Kjaedegaard, CEO of Maersk Line once
stated that: "we are not handcuffed by vessel-sharing partners in the major trades"
(Damas. P & Gillis .C, 2000)
However, recently MSL has seemed to have little change in its policy. MSL has slot
exchange agreements: with Evergreen on the transpacific service; with MSC and the
new world alliance ‘s members on the Tran Atlantic; and with MSC, K-line, NYK on
the Asia-Australia service.

4.1.9 Yield management

Shipping companies have been tirelessly striving for a cost reduction in order to
survive in the game and one way out for survival is to implement Yield Management.
In the industry, MSL is one of the few companies who have implemented yield
management

successfully.

Besides

other

ingredients

to

implement

Yield

Management, as explained in chapter two, MSL has made use of CRM (Customer
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Relationship Management) in container shipping. CRM, ‘’a marketing philosophy
that includes treating customers as partners and continually working to satisfy
customers’’ (Ma.S, 2002, p.2), has long been used by other industries but in shipping,
MSL is the pioneer. With CRM, MSL could understand the needs of existing,
potential customers by analysing a database about them, then in turn to help them to
assign staff to deliver a better service to the customers. MSL segmented customers
into four categories: Platinum (Strategic Customers), Gold (Medium Customers),
Silver (Small Customers) and Exit (not using MSL service or just go shopping price).
For the Platinum customers, they will assign skilful staff (even management level) to
take care of them, to pay regular visits and can be a logistics consultant for the
customer if they need. The ‘gold’ customer will be taken care of by the sale staff.
The customer service staff will be in charge of ‘Silver’ customers. The website and
portal will be directed to the ‘Exit’ customer. Container shipping has diversified
customers and is fragmented, therefore MSL has tried to direct those one-time or
just- for-shopping customers (‘exit’ customers) to the low cost sale channel by
electronic booking in its own web site or INTTRA portal. By implementing CRM,
MSL could save USD 60.5 million annually and they can ‘’sell the right service to
the right customer, at the right price with the right use of sale resource’’ (MSL, 2001)

Perhaps there are many other things that should be mentioned, but from the author’s
point of view those mentioned above are the aspects and strategies that MSL has
implemented successfully. The business philosophy of ‘‘independent’’, ‘’cost
effective’’, ‘‘controlling’’ and ‘’own presence in all important part of business’’ go
through MSL’s activities. MSL does things in their own way and tries to keep the
company in a low profile. Mr. Kjaedegaard, CEO of Maersk, once admitted, "We
have a very different philosophy from other lines that go out and say what they plan
to do. We say what we have done." (Damas. P & Gillis .C, 2000). 2001 was the bad
year for container shipping and year 2002 is expected to be worse. MSL reported a
loss last year and Mr. Kolding, chief financial officer of A.P. Moller said “It’s the
top task for our organization to get unit costs down.” and MSL will has ‘’a quite
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substantial program’’ to cut cost (Damas. P, 2002, July). We may expect some new
strategies to be implemented by MSL and hope that those could be the innovative
managements for container shipping. In the recent interview with CI-online, Mr. Jess
Soderbeg, CEO of the AP Moller group revealed that he is in favour of further
consolidation (‘’MSL.... consolidation’’, 2001) so we may see this biggest guy
become bigger in the near future.

4.2 – MOL

4.2.1- Historical background and general information

MOL has a long history since its initiating company, Osaka Shosen Kaisha (OSK
lines), which was founded in 1884. The name Mitsui O.S. K Lines was given as the
result of a merge between OSK lines and Mitsui Steamship Co., Ltd in 1964. At the
same time Maersk lines joined container shipping in 1968, Mitsui O.S. K lines began
its container service on the transpacific route. In 1999, the second merger with
NAVIX made MOL today the biggest shipping giant in the world in term of
deadweight.

Since 1964, with rapid and steady advances, MOL has become the global container
player and is known today as the one of the most profitable shipping companies in
the world. The development of MOL ‘s capacity (container shipping) from 19802001 is illustrated in figure 15 below. The ranking of MOL was changed over time, it
accepted to stand behind others in the game of capacity increase. Recently, MOL
placed orders for 16 new containerships with a total capacity of 85,500 TEU to be
deployed in 2002-2003, which is nearly a 40% increase in capacity. So in the 2003,
MOL could jump to 6th or 7th position.
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Japan is really a shipping nation, it has had three shipping lines in the list since 1980.
Among them, in terms of container fleet capacity, MOL used to be the biggest one
but in recent years it satisfied profitability with the low ranks (see figure 15).
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Figure 15: The development of MOL fleet capacity and ranking 1980-2001
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4.2.2: A diversified shipping company

MOL group consists of 337 companies covering the liners, tanker &gas carrier,
bulkers & car carriers, ferries, cruise ship, logistics, terminal and other related
activities, in which the liner business contributed around 40% (272 billion Yen) of its
total non-consolidated revenue (683 billion Yen, statistics of fiscal year 2001- see
figure 15).

In liner shipping, MOL is slipping behind, keeping lower ranks than its rivals but for
the other shipping segments, MOL is really the big one. AS can be seen in the figure
14, in 2001, the MOL group operated only 73 containerships but 310 bulkers/car
carriers and 101 tankers / Gas carriers. In 2001, MOL held 13th rank in the liner, 1st
rank in the bulk shipping (in term of deadweight), 3rd rank in the car carrier shipping
(in term of number of vessel), 2nd rank in tanker shipping (in term of deadweight), 1st
rank in LNG shipping (in terms of numbers of vessels) in the world shipping markets.
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Figure 16: MOL – Growth and expansion in 2001-2002

Source: Adapted from MOL annual report 2001, www.molpower.com

As a diversified shipping company, MOL could balance and keep the financial
results of all shipping segments in a healthy condition. Since 1994, MOL group has
transformed into the higher development by various management strategies. By
doing so, the financial result of MOL has been a steady growth since 1994 (see
figure 17).
Coming to the 21st century, MOL has a strong ambition and Mr. Suzuki, president of
MOL, says ‘‘my dream is for MOL to be no.1 in the shipping industry and to
contribute to society at large’’ (‘‘New year...with President Suzuki’’, 2002, p.2).
They will continue to invest more in the liners and the energy transport business. The
company has set up new group corporate principles as below.

1. As a multi-modal transport group, we will actively seize opportunities that
contribute to global economic growth and development by meeting and
responding to our customers’ needs and to this new era.
2. We will strive to maximize corporate value by always being creative,
continually pursuing higher operating efficiency and promoting an open and
visible management style that is guided by the highest ethical and social
standards
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3. We will promote and protect our environment by maintaining strict, sale
operation and navigation standards‘’
(Source: MOL 2002, p.1)

Figure 17: MOL- The financial performance chart
TURNOVER

NET PROFIT

OPERATING PROFIT
Note: Pre-tax Profit= Income before special
items & income taxes; Return on investment =
Operating Profit divided by Gross Assets; Fiscal
year commencing 1st of April to March 31st next
year.
Currency: Japan Yen Million
Source: Adapted from CI

4.2.3: Management style and strategies

In the traditional Japanese Management style, there were some aspects which
contrary with that of the European and American management style (Thurly K &
Widerius. H 1989, pp. 20-21)
(a) Work security versus individual freedom
(b) Organisation loyalty versus job competence
(c) Consultation and involvement versus management authority
(d) Work group innovation versus specialist know-how
Besides, Japanese lines had the ingrained service tradition of trying to satisfy any
need a customer expressed that sometimes prevented them from selecting the most
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profitable customers and cargo. Therefore, a report conducted by the Industrial Bank
of Japan (IBJ) in 1996 concluded that:
‘’Japanese shipping lines must abandon their peculiarly Japanese practices, or
face a grim future. In short, they must ‘de-Japanise’…A departure from
everything peculiarly Japanese, from marketing strategy to mentality and
practices, will lead Japanese liner operators to a new stage when they can
compete as a truly international shipping company’’ Source: (Japanese lines
must ‘de-Japanise, 1996, December p.20)

Recognizing the problem earlier, since 1994 MOL has implemented the strategies
lasting for three phases called ‘’MOCAR’’ (MOL’s Creative and Aggressive
Redesigning), MORE21 (Mitsui O.S.K Lines Redesigning for 21) and MOST21
(Mitsui O.S.K Lines ‘s Strategies Toward 21) where the restructuring of the MOL
liner business and its profitability are the key targets. The organization of the liner
division was decentralized and made up into new three regional operating units:
MOL (Europe), MOL (Asia) and MOL (America). Those organizations were formed
under MOL’s innovative concept VLC (Virtual Liner Company) where ‘’all of the
surrounding affiliate companies are treated as a single company (a virtual
company)’’ (Sato.H, 2002).

Continuing to improve MOL’s profitable growth, for the medium-term from 20012004, MOL has set up its new strategy named ‘MOL next’. That will bring a new
role to MOL’s liner shipping in the market. In this strategic plan, MOL emphasizes
to following points in the liner business:
ü Growth and expansion
ü Expansion of non-Japanese trade (Intra-Asia, Tran-Atlantic)
ü Seizing new business activities
ü Promotion of IT
ü Improvement of competitive edge
ü Improvement of financial structures
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ü Management reform
ü Training human resource

The human resource management is playing an important role in the MOL next and
as Mr.Suzuki, president of MOL, emphasized ‘‘the driving force behind our
company, of course, is our people’’ (New year..with President Suzuki ,January 2002,
p.2). Training and procurement plans have been established, in which MOL will
renew efforts ‘’ to tap the full potential’’ of its ‘’globalization of human resource’’
(Ikuta.M & Suzuki, K. 2002, p. 5). The ‘MOL next’ will be a revolution and create a
big jump for MOL if it is implemented successfully.

4.2.4: Partnership and long-term corporation.

While MSL has the business philosophy ‘‘independent and controlling’’, MOL
seemed to have‘’ partnership and cooperation’’. From the author’s view, there are
two main reasons that made MOL follow that philosophy:
Ø MOL is a listed company owned by a numerous number of
shareholders (136,705 shareholders, in which the majors are Japanese
Banks- Source: MOL);
Ø MOL is a Japanese company with the characteristics of being very
careful in thinking and making decision.

MOL ventured into new businesses where they could create a partnership, corporate
and spread the risk with others. That philosophy can be seen throughout MOL’s
operation:
Ø Joining

vessel

sharing

agreements,

slot

exchange,

alliance,

conferences;
Ø Making joint venture with local partner for agency activities;
Ø Making joint venture with local partner or trading companies for port,
terminal, logistics operation.

66

Making joint venture or cooperation with others could be a good way of spreading
risk and taking others advantages. However, in some cases, the cultural differences
and the conflict of interests could turn that joint venture into being a burden and put
company into a dilemma situation.

Over the last 20 years, MOL has been always an active, initiative carrier in the
shipping corporations like TRIO consortium and the TNWA alliances. By doing so,
MOL has improved its service quality and expanded global gradually. According to
Professor Porter of the Havard Business school (Porter. E.M. 1996, NovemberDecember, p.66), Japanese companies had been known as the pioneers in practices of:
total quality management and continuous improvement. What the rival did
successfully, they could quickly match, emulate and could do better. Container
shipping has been developed rapidly and tremendously in the last 20 years, most of
the innovations and strategies have been examined in practices. The latter may be the
one who can enjoy the experiences, lessons from the previous one. MOL, after years
standing behind and accumulating its healthy finances, is showing its goal ‘’ to
become one of the world’s best managed and most respected companies in any
industry’’ (Ikuta. M & Suzuki. K. 2002, p 3). MOL has integrated in all major
transport chains: logistics, terminal, port, sea/air transport, and value added services.
However, the vertical and horizontal expansions of MOL are likely seen in the near
future. The bad year 2002 make MOL considered to cut operating costs in the liner
division by nearly 83 million US dollars (‘’MOL…fat’’, Fairplay, 2002) and MOL
will continue to perfect their organization and operation.

4.3: Evergreen
4.3.1: Historical background and general information

Unlike AP Moller or MOL, Evergreen Marine Corp (EMC) is quite a newly
established shipping company. Mr. Chang Yung-Fa placed the first stone for the
Evergreen group by a second-hand tramp ship in 1968. In 1972, Evergreen launched
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its liner service between Asia and USEC and really joined container shipping in 1975
with the transpacific service by its fully cellular containerships. This newly
established carrier had made a successful independent service between Asia and
Europe in 1979 and was the first carrier to operate RTW (Round The World Service)
linking Asia, Europe and USA in 1984. During the period 1980-2001, EMC occupied
8 times first positions in the top 20 leagues (see figure 18). After steady growth from
1984-1991 with the introduction of the new RTW services, EMC had a pause in
1992-1995. Recently, it was positioned behind MSL and PONCL. In its life,
Evergreen has taken over Uniglory, Lloyd Trestino and in 2001 it was ranked in third
position in the league. EMC nowadays is a listed company of the Evergreen group,
which is active in many fields like aviation, shipping, port operation, container
manufacture, road transport, hotels, and other activities.
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The changing of business environment made EMC, an independent minded carrier,
to revise its strategies to respond to those changes.

4.3.2

Changing strategies: from independence to cooperation

In the 1980s, Evergreen wanted to be an independent carrier and was reluctant to
joint corporation with other carriers, especially with ‘global carriers’ (Evergreen’s
show of strength, 1997, February, p.19). Having acknowledged the benefits of co-

68

Rank

Capacity

Figure 18: The development of MSC fleet capacity and ranking, 1980-2001

operation, EMC had

deals with some smaller-scale carriers in the early 1990s. In

2000 to now, one interesting point in the EMC group’s strategies is that they tried to
make cooperation with the different carriers for their affiliates. Finally, the whole
Evergreen group will be able to offer various schedule options to customers. They
have slot exchange agreements with:
Ø The New World Alliance’s members (APL, MOL, Hyundai) for
transpacific
Ø MSL for East Asia-North American
Ø CMA-CGM for transpacific.
Ø CMA-CGM for Asia -Europe route
Ø COSCO, NYK and others for Asia/South Africa/East Coast of Shout
America
Ø COSCO, Yangming and others for Europe/India Sub continental route.
Cooperation will be a new strategy for the Evergreen group according to Mr. An,
Arnold Wang, executive vice president of the corporate business division at
Evergreen, who admitted ‘‘the efficient use of ocean-borne tonnage and cooperation
between carriers will provide built-in economies that will best serve our customers’’
(MSL and Evergreen…. cooperative pact. 2002). 2002 also marked the important
change in EMC. EMC and its affiliates HATSU, Lloyd Trestino has a ‘’carriers
group agreement’’ with 14 members of TSA (Tran-Pacific Stabilization Agreement)
which permitted those companies "to discuss, share information, and reach voluntary
agreements with the TSA and its members’’ (Lloyd Trestino…TSA lines, 2002).

4.3.3 Changing strategy: expanding services to logistics

Unlike other carriers: APL, MSL, MOL, PONCL, which have already integrated in
logistics and other shipping related services, EMC used to say that they wanted to be
concerned the core shipping business only. Now, things have changed. In the
statement for the plan of 2002, Evergreen announced that it would ‘‘respond to the
trend towards total logistics by targeting areas such as China, South East Asia, the
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Indian Subcontinent and South America for investment in forwarding operations,
container depots, warehousing and trucking’’(‘’Evergreen.. .. logistics’’, 2002). The
Taiwanese carrier has faced up to many difficulties in penetrating the Chinese market
due to the political sensitivities. According to the Chinese rules, Taiwanese ships,
Taiwan-flagged ships cannot make direct voyages or call at any port in China as
other foreign carriers can do. That is the reason why consolidation in shipping is a
trend but EMC had to split up its organization and operation and tries to sell services
to the Chinese market under its affiliated company’s brand Lloyd Trestino or under
the newly established company HATSU based in London. This year, 2002, EMC,
together with 60 other lines, was granted ‘International Liner Operating Permits’ by
China‘s Ministry of Communications. However, it will not be easy for EMC as they
are struggling in many ways to find a gateway to the potential mainland market.
EMC, the market challenger, will continue to challenge the traditional shipping liners
and to expand its business.

4.4: MSC

4.4.1: Historical background and general information

‘‘To perform similar activities in different ways’’ that is MSC, a company with a low
profile but it has got intentions from the industry because of its meteoric rise. Mr.
Aponte founded MSC in 1970 with only one 11-year-old ship M/S Patricia 2,800dwt.
The Company inaugurated its liner service in 1973 and started to carry containers on
board general cargo ships in 1977. Gradually, MSC has emerged in the industr y,
entering the top 20 league in 1993 in 18th position and holding 5th position in 2001
(see figure 19). MSC is going global and has some secrets and exclusive strategies in
approaching to container shipping.
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4.4.2 Organization and management
MSC does not disclose its financial result, because Mr. Aponte is the sole owner of
the company. He is closely controlling the company with the roles ‘’that a president,
chairman and chief executive would hold in more conventionally structured liner
shipping companies’’ as the Lloyd Shipping Economist analysed (‘’Captain Aponte’s
secret’’, 2001, January, p.31).
The ideas of ‘‘controlling’’ and ‘‘independent’’ seem to be attached to company’s
operation. Since the first liner services in the North Europe- Africa, MSC established
its own agency network: MSC (SA), Medite Shipping (UK), MSC France, MSC
Espana, MSC (Australia), etc. MSC is an independent-minded carrier. They saw
vessel sharing as purely pragmatic and Mr. Aponte once stated that ‘‘I hate that…
hope that we will never have to do it’’ (‘’Gradualist…brings rewards’’,
1995,Setember, p.23). According to Mr. Aponte, alliances are anathema and he has
to do so where there is no sensible alternative (‘’Captain Aponte’s secret’’, 2001,
January, p.31).

4.4.3: Tonnage policy
MSC’s approach to container shipping is the unorthodox success. They tried to play
assets by buying second hand ships when the market is low and selling ships when
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Figure 19: The development of MSC fleet capacity and ranking 1993-2001

the second hand ship market or scrapping market is high. They buy ships that were
aging or surplus to the needs of its rivals. While other liners pursued the modern,
faster ship, MSC used aging, slower ships for the lower cost. In some trades like the
Africa market, freight rates are more important than transit time. MSC got support
from those trades by offering lower rates and longer transit time service than others.

In liner shipping, it is not easy to withdraw ships from regular services for asset play
but MSC is successful in doing that. Looking at the MSC fleet composition in 2002,
they owned most of the vessels aged between 20-30 years which occupied one third
of the fleet; for the younger fleet from 1-10 years old, they owned only 33% (25
ships) and chartered 67% (50 ships) (see table 16).

Until now, MSC has started with its new building programmes but it has not given
up the second hand tonnage policy. For the new building tonnage, MSC paid close
attention to the new building market. They will place orders when that market is low
and it could take full advantage of the precious capital. MSC’s new building backlog
for 2001 is 14 ships, which are to be delivered at the end of 2002 and in 2003. The
portion of chartered tonnage in the whole MSC fleet is relatively high (41% in 2001),
in which MSC has also implemented a strategy to charter tonnage when the charter
market is weak and they can enjoy the benefits when the charter market goes up.

Table 16: MSC- Fleet composition profile
Year build

1968-1980

No. of ship, Owned /Chartered in 44 /13
Sub total no. of ship
57
Percentage on total MSC fleet
33%

1981-1990

1991-2002

Total

29/13
42
24%

25/50
75
43%

98/76
174
100%

Source: Compiled from CI

Besides, MSC has a policy of maximizing the ship’s utilization; if one market is
unprofitable they will withdraw or switch ship to other service for better utilization
(Captain Aponte’s, 2001, January, p.32). This flexible policy has made MSC being
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profitable while other liners have to struggle to maintain their committed services.
All the exclusive tonnage policies could only be performed by carriers with the
‘‘going alone’’ policy like MSC.

4.4.4: Service expansion

MSC took very carefully steps in its service expansion. They set up offices in a new
region, started services on a small scale, and then expanded services when MSC saw
the profitability (‘‘Captain Aponte’s secret’’, 2001, January, p.31). MSC offered only
one sailing per week with limited port coverage and slowly penetrated the market.
However, this kind of service cannot always meet the requirements of global
customers.

MSC used to be stuck to container shipping but recently they decided to diversify
business and are developing their cruise-shipping segment under the brand name
Mediterranean Shipping Cruise.

MSC is performing a liner shipping service in a different way, especially by the
tonnage policy. It has got very successful results in the past years. Recently with the
expansion programmes, MSC has placed more new bigger ships in its fleet. So, from
the author’s point of view, in order to fulfil the allocation of those ships, they will
have to ‘‘love’’ the alliance or slot sharing with other liners. They may change their
‘‘going alone policy’’ and management style to adapt to the new situation. The
approaches of MSC to container shipping are exclusive and have shown some ‘’food
for thought’’ to other liners.

**************************************************

This chapter has analysed some of the main strategies and management ways that
have been implemented by MSL, MOL, Evergreen, MSC to outperform, perfect their
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operations and their responses to the market changes. It seems that in the previous
times, for family shipping companies like MSC, MSL, EMC they preferred to be
independent and for other listed companies or companies having numerous share
holders like MOL, NYK, etc, they preferred spreading the risks and wanted to have
business co-operation. Now the situation has changed, all of them have seen the
benefits of co-operation. They are co-operating to live in this risky container
shipping industry. The two big independent-minded shipping companies, MSL and
EMC, have recently tightened their cooperation; firstly, by moving the Asian
transhipment hub to the PTP (Port of Tanjung Pelapas- Malaysia) where APM has its
share, and then by cooperating through the slot exchange agreements. The
cooperation among big, independent carriers will continue and perhaps there will be
more consolidations among them.

Not only are the four liners mentioned in this chapter diversified shipping companies,
but also most of the liners in the leagues in recent years are diversified shipping
companies too. Diversified shipping and horizontal, vertical expansion will
compleme nt the core container shipping business. In some cases, those create a
cross-subsidy for the whole group’s business.

Through the study in chapters two and three, container shipping in the past 20 years
is seemed to be a low profitable industry. However, there are many shipping
companies remaining in this industry. It is said the reasons behind this were due to:
that was the company’s traditional business, optimism about the market and the
inertia about the operation and management of shipping companies.

The

world

is

changing

and

Mr.

Ikuta,

former

president

of

MOL

remarked: ’’successful companies are the ones quickest to adapt to the changes’’
(Ikuta, 1998). In the next chapter, the author examines the major developments,
trends in container shipping and the expected reactions of the top 20 to adapt to those
changes.
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CHAPTER 5
SOME TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN LINER SHIPPING
Sailing into the 21s t century, there are many trends happening, which could offer both
opportunities and threats to liner shipping, and to the top 20 liners in particular. In a time
of uncertainty, for some carriers, that is a good opportunity and for others is a disaster.
Carriers will have to think globally but at the same time they have to act locally, to
devote services that can be meet more demanding of both international and local
customers. The top 20 liners have been the driving forces of the container shipping
industry and their reactions to the trends will determine the future of container shipping.
Below, the author would like to examine those trends and the reaction of top 20 in
particular.

5.1 Tonnage policy

Pursuing ‘economics of scale’, the top 20 liners will continue to order Panamax or PostPanamax containerships. Those ships will not be obsolete and could have acceptable
residual value in the future market. Even liners are planning to order mega –ships with a
capacity of over 10,000 TEU. There have been some studies to show that such a mega
ship could create more problems than it could bring benefits to liners and society and
these ships could fit for Equatorial Round The World Service. For carriers, the problems
will be: the imbalance of equipment; the possibility of fulfilling a ship’s allocation. For
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the ports and society, they will be: the new investment for handling equipment, dredging;
the bottlenecks caused by a massive number of containers to be handled at the same time;
the environmental impacts caused by dredging ports and channels and other problems.
More over, in the current business environment, the author predicted that those mega
ship will not likely be introduced until the next four or five years. Stopford concluded in
his study that carriers should concentrate on the capacity increase of medium sized
vessels (2000-4000 TEU) rather than bigger ship (‘’Size is not everything’’, June 2002)

Off-balance sheet and charter in tonnage will be an increasing trend in the top 20 liner.
Under the market condition of uncertainty nowadays, liners will spread the risks of
investment to non-operating owners. There will be a situation where non-traditional
liners with limited capital could expand services and operate their fleets mainly with
chartered tonnage. They will enter the market during the peak times and withdraw
services during the weak periods. In some cases, they can enter the league and come
over other traditional liners in terms of capacity deployment.

5.2 Consolidation

Container shipping is still fragmented, because there are many shipping companies
operating liner services. The low profitability, as the author explained in the chapter
three, is one of the main reasons that lead to more consolidations in container shipping.
In 2002, the wave of consolidation in the top 20 did not happen as people expected. The
uncertainties made liners become concerned about its growth organically and paid keen
attention to the cash flow and liquidity. The conflict in cultural and management style
between two liners could also be a barrier. Moreover, any merger and acquisition among
liners in the top 20, may have to get anti-trust approval from the relevant authorities. All
are barriers that prevent consolidation in the top 20. However, this trend will be more
likely to happen because one of the most effective ways to cut administration costs, to
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reduce the fierce competition among the same size liners is merging or acquisition.
According to the study of WestLB Panmure, the investment analysts in 2002 the
possible consolidation candidates in the top 20 are: PONL, ZIM, HANJIN, OOCL,
HLCL, OOCL (Damas. P, 2002, July, p. 29).

5.3 Diversification

Most of the liners in the league are diversified shipping companies. The low profitability
together and the heavy investments have made carriers diversify their business. By doing
so, they can spread risks to other shipping segments like: bulker, tanker, LPG, passenger
shipping, ferry, etc. They will also integrate other activities like: terminals, ports,
logistics and value added services. As a result, liners will belong to one group, or
shipping giant, that is involved in various activities.

5.4 E-commerce and shipping portals

In the game of survival, liners have to maximize profit and minimize cost. One method
is to introduce a low-cost sale channel to the customer. E-commerce is that channel.
Liners are encouraging customers to do transactions online as they wanted to emulate
the passenger air transport. Besides a carrier’s own web sites for e-commerce, they are
also offering the customer ‘real time booking’ via neutral shipping portals like: GT
Nexus, INTTRA, CargoSmart. Carriers see those portals as a facility rather than
different services. As Mr. Thomas Eskesen, director of the e-commerce line department
at Maersk Sealand said ‘‘we don’t believe it’s a competitive factor" (Damas. P &
Gillis .C, 2000).

In shipping personal contacts play a very important role in every part of the transaction
and one factor that can make a difference between liners is people. Supporting this
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argument, Mr. Sanguinetti, former sales and marketing manager of MOL (Europe),
stated: ‘‘despite everything one reads about internet… shipping is still very much a
people’s business, and our sales reps play an important role in this area’’ (Beddow. M
2000, September, p.40). Therefore, in spite of the rapid implementation of E-commerce
and portals in shipping, people are still playing a pivotal role in every part of the
shipping business. Capable and skilful staff will contribute much to the success of liners.

5.5 Alliance and conference

In a recent report, OECD voiced their concerns for the anti-trust exemption given to
liners for freight conferences, pricing stabilization agreements and recommended
governments to abolish this system (OECD, 2001). This report used many data in order
to draw a picture of container shipping as a profitable industry. They argued that the
conference, pricing stabilization agreements were barriers for trade facilitation. Through
this study from 1980-2001, the picture that OECD has drawn was not truly reflected the
container shipping industry because the data they used came from various sources. In the
response of WSC to OECD’s report, WSC also remarked that ‘‘the report’s data has
significant problems and is often presented in a biased and misleading fashion’’ (WSC,
2001, p.2).

There is a fact that conferences and pricing stabilization agreements have less power
than they had in the past, but those systems proved effective and efficient somehow.
Table 17 shows the number of conferences and alliances that the top 20 carriers are
joining in 2002. Not only traditional shipping companies are members of major
conferences like: PONL (65 conferences and 8 alliances), MSL (49 conferences) but
also some ‘new’ shipping companies like CSCL is a member of 1 conference and 1
alliance (table 17).
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Now, the world is busy in recovering from the economic recession, the war against
terrorism and liners are struggling for survival. Therefore, there it is unlikely to have any
change in the regulatory system for the anti-trust exemption of liners in the coming years.
However, in the author’s view, liners should not abuse their anti-trust exemption by
imposing surcharges or increasing freight rate to the too high levels that the market
could hardly bear within the short time notice.
Table 17: The conference and alliance membership of the top 20 liners
No.of Conferences

MSL

PONL

EMC

Hanjin

MSC

APL

Cosco

CMA

NYK

CP ship

49

65

9

6

8

18

6

35

49

NA

8

1

5

1

2

1

6

5

NA

Zim

CSAV

Joined
No. of Alliances
Joined
K Line

OOC

MOL

Huyndai

CSCL

HLCL

L
No. of Conferences

Yangming

Hamburg
Sud

37

23

18

17

1

27

16

14

8

8

4

3

3

1

1

3

1

3

4

2

joined
No.

of

Alliances

joined

Note: Statistics as of July 2002

Source: compiled from CI

The alliances, with many advantages as explained in chapter two, have been the wave of
the future for the container shipping industry. Sooner or later, few independent- minded
carriers would have to change their policy and joint or create new alliances with the
partners having the same capacities and management style. Recently, we see many
cooperative agreements among the big lines in the leagues like: MSL and Evergreen for
12 months slot exchange agreement in Tran-Pacific from 2002-2003, MSC, K-Line and
NYK in Asia- Europe route. This means the power and market share have been in the
hand of some major, global carriers and there will be little room for small carriers to
enter the major routes.
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5.6 The growth trend of demand and supply

In 2001, the world container traffic increased only by 5%, this was the lowest level in
the last few years and the world economy is still recovering slowly. However, many new
building ships have been introduced into the market ‘‘at a stage in the cycle at which the
rate of delivery of new containerships was approaching an all time high’’ according to
Mr. Tung, chairman of OOIL (Damas. P, 2002, July, p. 25). The surplus of tonnage is
inevitable which result in low freight rate and deterioration profit margin. Therefore,
many carriers in the top 20 have redefined their plan to fill this gap such as: cost cuttings,
expanding uses of IT for booking, decreasing new orders and others method. The
delivery of new buildings in the 2004 was expected to be low as Mr. Bourne, managing
director of MOL (Europe) says: ‘’new buildings in 2004 will be at a record low. With
the current return on capital, no one is going to order new ships’’(Damas. P, 2002, July,
p. 27).

According to the figure 20, the world container traffic is forecasted to be 280 million
TEU in 2005 and 427 million TEU in 2010, an increase by 18% and 80% in comparison
with that of 2001 respectively. Stopford analyzed that the major markets, which will
contribute to the future growth, will be ‘’largely outside the major east-west axis and
will occur in South America, Eastern Europe and also China’’(‘‘Size is not everything’’,
June 2002).

Of course, a forecast is a forecast and no one can be sure of the figures. Thus, how can
the supply side cope with this demand in growth? The big will get bigger, but how big is
enough, are those big entities capable of managing the huge network and how can they
can deal with the imbalance of trade. Those will be the real challenges for the whole
industry and for the top 20 liners themselves.
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Figure 20: The forecast of world container traffic
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**************************************************

In brief, this chapter has examined some developments and shipping trends in the
industry: tonnage policy, diversification, alliances/conferences, consolidation, shipping
portals and demand, supply. The development of container shipping in the last 20 years
is really the story of the ups and downs of the shipping companies. Those ups and downs
will continue to happen and shipping lines have to be proactive to those developments,
shipping trends for their survival and development.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

The liner shipping business has changed dramatically. The changes in demand have
made the supply to renovate itself continuously to cope with such changes. The
average annual growth rate of 9.6% of the world container traffic during period
1980-2001 has facilitated the expansion of the world container fleet capacity by 8.7%
per annum and the top 20 liners to grow by 11.1% respectively in this period. As can
be seen from those figures and from the appendix D, the demand grew faster than the
supply. The growth of the world container traffic, the world fleet capacity and the top
20 fleet capacity evolved in a cycle and those lines rarely went together. All those
indications show: the fluctuations of liner shipping; the problems in shipping forecast,
in capacity planning of the carriers; and the improvement of the containership fleet’s
productivity during this period.

‘‘The law of survival of the fittest applies to container shipping’’ (Damas. P, 2000,
July, p.47) and carriers have to consider some main strategies for their survival as
mentioned in chapter two:
Ø Conference or non- conference
Ø Alliance/ consortium or solo
Ø Ownership or outsource
Ø Global carrier or niche carrier
Ø Total logistic provider or ocean carrier
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Ø The routing option: RTW, Pendulum, End-to-end, Hub-spoke or
direct call service.
Ø The yield management

From the study of the top 20 leagues from 1980-2001, there are some main findings
as the author explains in chapter three:
Ø The top 20 liners are controlling more world fleet capacity
Ø Big is bigger
Ø Merger and acquisition help a carrier to jump to a higher rank
Ø The top 20 carriers have been increasing their chartered tonnage
fleet
Ø The Asian carriers have dominated the top 20
Ø Maintaining rank means increasing capacity even unprofitable.
Capacity increased as a result of the short prosperity periods in
shipping
Ø Profitability is not correlated with a company’s size.
Through the period 1980-2001, container shipping is known as a risky, low
profitability industry with relatively short booming periods as author explained in
chapter three. Liners have been continuously placing stakes on the table for their
poker game. Hence, there is a paradox that many shipping companies are being
engaged in the liner business and the top 20 liners are increasing continuously their
capacity in the coming years. It is said that there are three main reasons that some
liners remaining in the container shipping, in spite of the low profitability:
Ø Container shipping is the company’s traditional business,
Ø They are too optimistic about market; they always expect that the
profit is about the corner
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Ø They are too inertia in changing company’s operation and
management

Some carriers in the league outperformed others by applying their own strategies or
redefining and renovating themselves in the game. These showed some food for
thought to the industry as the author analyses in chapter four. In the league, it is
clearly indicated that some carriers have been overstretching themselves to pursue
market shares and market coverage. This will really damage the health of the
container shipping industry. Those carriers should avoid the trap of growth by
increasing market coverage or capacity regardless to profitability.
Entering to the 21st century, liners have to be proactive to the shipping trends and
developments such as: tonnage policy, alliance /conference, diversification,
consolidation, IT. Because the top 20 liner are the main force of the industry
therefore their reaction to those trends and development will determine the future of
the container shipping industry as the author explains in chapter five.

In chapter three, the author explains the structures of the top 20 in period 1980-2001.
Therefore, in the author’s opinion, the container shipping will be the playground
mainly for the European and Asian lines. In the top 20, the number of the European
liners may be reduced, as their parent group could find no longer interest in liner
shipping. This decrease in number will give way for more the Asian liners entering
the league. However, the European carriers have many advantages in capital,
technology and infrastructure. So, if they merger together, in case it may be, the
number of them could be reduced but the individual carrier’s size could much bigger
than that of the individual Asian carriers.

In the way of development and cementing a position in the industry, liners should
make use of their assets through tonnage policy, alliance, and co-operation. They
should also need to renovate their operation, management and to reduce the heavy
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costs caused from administrative works and from the imbalance of equipment
through yield management.

Among liners, their services do not have many differences and Ma (2002, p.3) writes
that ‘‘service innovations can not be patented and are easily copied’’. Therefore,
what a liner has done successfully in ‘cost leadership’ and ‘differentiation’ strategies,
its rival could quickly copy, match and may do better. In the game of survival, liners
having the same sizes try to outperform and match each other. Even, a liner will take
over other smaller-size company to increase its size to come over its rival somehow.
If that liner has no clear strategies or wants to reduce the competition with its rival, it
has no better idea than to merge with or take over others, like the cases of: Maersk
and Sealand, P&O and Nedlloyd.

Porter (1980, p.4-6) emphasizes: ‘‘the state of competition in an industry depends on
five basic competitive forces [the entry of new competitors, the threat of substitutes,
the bargaining power of buyer, the bargaining power of suppliers, the rivalry among
the existing competitors]… and that competition in an industry goes well beyond the
established players’’. He argued that there are three ‘‘potential successful generic
strategic approaches’’ to cope with these five competitive forces.

The generic

strategies are: overall cost leadership, differentiation, and focus (Porter 1980, p.35).
According to Porter (1980, p. 41) a firm should avoid being stuck in the middle of
these three strategies and it should select the strategy ‘‘best suited to the firm
strength and once least replicable by competitors’’ (Porter, 1980, p.44). He also says:
‘‘rarely is a firm suited for all three’’ (Porter, 1980, p.42).

Nowadays, there is a question that which strategies a liner could choose if its service
has no much difference than others and its service patterns could be easily copied? In
the business environment today, liners have to think globally but act locally and the
multidimensional strategic approach must be better than a monotonous strategy.
Therefore, the author believes that liners in the top 20 should implement ‘cost leader
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ship’ and ‘differentiation’ strategies in the broad, global scale and implement ‘focus’
strategy locally because:
Ø With the cost leadership strategy, they could offer service at lower
cost (by bigger ship, in-house agency, tonnage policy, EDI, VLC and
others)
Ø With the differentiation strategy, they could differ themselves with
other liners (manning, valued added services, logistics, branding)
Ø With the focus strategy
§

They could select and target segments, markets and customer
group and choose the most profitable segments to serve

§

They can achieve competitive advantages by optimising
strategies to these segments, markets, and customer groups
(cost leader ship or differentiation strategies). Consequently,
its rival could hardly copy and match whole its focus strategies
to these targets

Ø And if liners pursue only the cost leader ship strategy by imitating
each other’s performance, the profitability will drop and no one can
win.

It is not easy to forecast how the picture of the top 20 liners will be in the next period.
The author believes the future will belong to the successful management shipping
companies having the right strategic approach that can identify, quantify and
anticipate to the needs and changes of the markets.

Perhaps there will be more

consolidations, bankruptcies, more new-comers to the leagues and the ups and downs
of liners is likely to happen, just like the earth evolves on its axis.
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Appendix A: The financial result of some liners from 1980-1989
Source: CI
Company

Sealand

APC/APL

NOL

K Line

Financial data in US $ Million 1980

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1,716 1,692

1,811 1,966

1,554 1,807

1,961 2,118

Revenues

1,414 1,623

1,583 1,586

1,759 1,634

1,553 1,788

2,105 2,343

Operating profit

64

100

131

64

132

-22

-105

84

68

38

Net Profit

41

15

76

43

81

14

-60

-109

44

21

Assets

586

677

712

790

987 1,060

1,343 1,599

1,711 1,661

Revenues

578

655

679

757

911 1,171

1,440 1,825

2,131 2,234

Operating profit

43

44

53

33

116

52

41

149

136

22

Net Profit

43

42

48

26

104

39

18

79

81

11

Assets

409

488

636

660

684

838

877 1,004

Revenues

306

339

350

376

379

378

422

510

598

678

Operating profit

14

14

6

4

5

-7

-27

12

25

42

Net Profit

13

15

6

6

5

-4

-27

11

24

38

1,072 1,279

Assets

1,116 1,288

1,295 1,401

1,344 1,419

2,080 2,286

2,369 2,114

Revenues

1,638 1,734

1,509 1,548

1,661 1,675

1,926 2,297

2,444 2,486

Hapag Lloyd Assets
Revenues
Operating profit
Net Profit

24

25

7

3

29

21

-38

-15

14

36

9

10

12

6

13

-5

-42

-42

-15

21

1,012

842

778

566

567

524

643

757

926

779

1,174 1,022

1,148 1,313

1,087

999

936

983

5

14

-7

-47

9

45

29

39

1,064 1,076
30

18

-11

-3

-23

-56

21

26

11

16

11

10

Assets

1,787 1,710

1,692 1,602

1,793 1,689

2,491 2,547

2,587 2,575

Revenues

1,521 1,794

1,584 1,462

1,525 1,412

1,607 2,337

2,501 2,834

Operating profit

105

94

42

9

67

43

32

-540

74

99

64

59

22

-32

48

43

29

-497

78

119

Assets

711

600

535

494

670

578

736

790

770

704

Revenues

818

786

780

758

705

755

906 1,079

Operating profit

-82

-33
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Appendix B: Carrier’s financial roller-coaster 1999-2001
Source: American Shipper
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Appendix C: Shipping Lines ranked by 2001 operating profit
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Appendix D:

The growth of the world container traffic, the world container fleet capacity and
the top 20 fleet capacity, 1980-2001
Source: Author, combined from CI, Drewry

15.0%

5.0%

19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01

Growth (%)

25.0%

-5.0%
Year
World traffic

World fleet

97

Top 20 fleet

